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INTRODUCTION 
Alan Greenspan described the growth and development of financial 
derivatives as “[b]y far the most significant event in finance during the past 
decade.”1  It has been asserted that credit derivatives act as “shock 
absorber[s]” that cushion against widespread loss in the case of corporate 
crises.2  The credit derivatives market has been likened to a “new continent 
with boundless opportunity.”3  On the other hand, derivatives have been 
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 1. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors, Financial 
Derivatives:  Remarks Before the Futures Industry Association (Mar. 19, 1999), 
http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19990319.htm.  Greenspan credited the 
growth of derivatives with being one of several “key factors underpinning the greater 
resilience of our largest financial institutions.”  Risk Transfer and Financial Stability: 
Remarks to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Forty-First Annual Conference on Bank 
Structure (May 5, 2005), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/Speeches/2005/20050505/default.htm. 
Derivatives have been called “indispensable tools for hedging risks and managing balance 
sheets.”  J. Christopher Kojima, Product-Based Solutions to Financial Innovation:  The 
Promise and Danger of Applying the Federal Securities Laws to OTC Derivatives, 33 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 259, 260 (1995) (“Engineered by sophisticated mathematicians and physicists in 
major financial institutions, derivative instruments have provided the opportunity to harness 
volatility and control uncertainty in securities and commodities markets, interest rates, and 
exchange rates.”). 
 2. Noah L. Wynkoop, The Unregulables? The Perilous Confluence of Hedge Funds 
and Credit Derivatives, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 3095, 3099 (2008). 
 3. Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives:  How to Approach 
the Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705, 706 (2008) 
(“Financial institutions, as well as individual investors, are mobilizing all of their resources 
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termed the “the risk that still won’t go away,”4 called the “11-letter dirty 
word,”5 referred to as “financial weapons of mass destruction,”6 likened to 
“the middle age practice of alchemy, by which practitioners attempted to 
convert lead into gold,”7 and credited with contributing to the creation of 
the current global financial crisis (“GFC”). 
Derivatives are financial instruments for which value is “derived” 
from underlying assets, such as mortgages, stocks, bonds or other 
commodities.  Some derivatives are traded on an exchange, but most are 
over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives, or privately negotiated transactions 
between two counterparties.  They are essential to the functioning of global 
financial markets and the economy because they are invaluable tools to 
help manage risk.8  They can be used as a hedge against potential losses 
from unpredictable changes in commodity and financial markets.  As such, 
if used properly, derivatives are a good way of transferring risk.  Moreover, 
because credit derivatives allow banks to pass on the risk of making loans, 
they can increase liquidity and access to capital.9  However, when they are 
 
as they jump into this frontier head-on.”). 
 4. Carol J. Loomis, Derivatives:  The Risk that Still Won’t Go Away, FORTUNE, July 6, 
2009, at 54. 
 5. Desmond Eppel, Note, Risky Business:  Responding to OTC Derivative Crises, 40 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 677, 692 (2002). 
 6. As early as 2002, Warren Buffett spoke out against the expanding use of 
derivatives.  His warnings now seem prophetic: 
[T]he macro picture is dangerous and getting more so.  Large amounts of risk, 
particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few 
derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one other.  The 
troubles of one could quickly infect the others.  On top of that, these dealers are 
owed huge amounts by non-dealer counterparties.  Some of these 
counterparties, as I’ve mentioned, are linked in ways that could cause them to 
contemporaneously run into a problem because of a single event (such as the 
implosion of the telecom industry or the precipitous decline in the value of 
merchant power projects).such as the implosion of the telecom industry or the 
precipitous decline in the value of merchant power projects).  Linkage, when it 
suddenly surfaces, can trigger serious systemic problems. 
Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 
to Shareholders (Feb. 21, 2003), available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf. 
 7. Kim, supra note 3, at 706. 
 8. Darrell Duffie & Henry T.C. Hu, Competing for a Share of Global Derivatives 
Markets:  Trends and Policy Choices for the United States 3 (Stanford Univ., Working 
Paper Series No. 50, 2008).  Until recently, academic literature has ignored derivatives.  
Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2007). 
 9. Wynkoop, supra note 2, at 3099; see also Norman Menachem Feder, 
Deconstructing Over-The-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 687-691 
(2002) (discussing the fact that derivatives can be used to reallocate market and credit risks). 
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not used correctly, they magnify losses and spread risk.10  In that case, 
instead of distributing risk, it is concentrated in “opaque and complex 
ways.”11 
From the year 2000 to mid-2008, the worldwide notional value12 of 
 
 10. See generally Brooksley Born, International Regulatory Responses to Derivative 
Crises:  The Role of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 607, 608 (2001) (analyzing the response to three different derivatives crises).  Lily 
Tijoe argues that credit derivatives present liquidity, short squeeze, settlement, 
concentration, document, trade confirmation, and assignment risks.  Credit Derivatives: 
Regulatory Challenges in an Exploding Industry, 26 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 387, 
399-413 (2007).  See also, Kojima, supra note 1, at 272-75 (discussing market risk, credit 
risk and systemic risk); Lydie Nadia Cabrera Pierre-Louis, Controlling a Financial Jurassic 
Park:  Obtaining Jurisdiction Over Derivatives by Regulating Illegal Foreign Currency 
Boiler Rooms, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 35, 48 (2007) (discussing the four types of risks 
associated with derivatives:  1) market risk, 2) credit risk, 3) operational risk, and 4) legal 
risk).  See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text (discussing that regulation, to be 
effective, must attempt to minimize these risks without hampering the benefits of 
derivatives).  
Derivatives can also be used to speculate on price changes.  When used to speculate, use of 
derivatives actually increases risk.  See, e.g., Kim, supra note 3, at 708 (“In becoming a 
medium for speculative transactions, credit derivatives increased, rather than alleviated, 
risk.”); John T. Lynch, Comment, Credit Derivatives:  Industry Initiative Supplants Need 
for Direct Regulatory Intervention—A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55 BUFF. 
L. REV. 1371, 1374 (2008) (“Derivatives allow a speculator to take a position based on how 
he thinks a market will move, but without having to purchase outright the instruments or 
assets that make up that market.”).  Some have criticized that the derivative market can be 
used for speculation.  See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators:  Regulation 
and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 713 (1999).  
Stout argues: 
The net result is a legal system that works with surprising consistency to 
channel our nation’s economic energy toward the actual production and 
distribution of goods and services, and away from the pursuit of short-term 
trading profits. . . . These rules suggest a pattern of legal antipathy toward 
speculators that springs from the longstanding belief that speculation wreaks 
economic harm because it is nonproductive, distorts market prices, and 
impoverishes speculators themselves. 
Id.  On the other hand, others have argued that speculators “play a key role in derivatives 
markets because they are presumed to provide liquidity.”  Feder, supra note 9, at 719. 
 11. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW 
FOUNDATION:  REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 43 (2009) [hereinafter 
White Paper], available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
 12. The notional value is the market value of the assets or debt balance upon which 
payments are made.  Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives:  The Causes of 
Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 
1459 n.6 (1993).  However, when the derivative is cash-settled, the notional amount is 
“hypothetical because it is not exchanged between the parties.”  Feder, supra note 9, at 684.  
Moreover, the notional amount is not used to account for derivatives on financial 
statements.  Id. at 686 (“Because notional amounts exaggerate exposure, treating such 
amounts as principal in cash instruments would overstate assets or liabilities.”). 
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derivatives grew from $95 trillion to $684 trillion.13  Despite the enormous 
amounts of money involved,14 and the calls for reform in both academic 
circles15 and in the popular press,16 there has been little regulation of the 
OTC derivatives market.17  The calls for reform have intensified in light of 
the current GFC and the role that derivatives played in that crisis.  The 
severity of the GFC cannot be overstated18 nor can the role that derivatives 
 
 13. Loomis, supra note 4.  The Bank for International Settlements estimated that OTC 
derivatives had a notional value of around $94 trillion in 2000 and that exchange traded 
derivatives had an estimated notional value of approximately $13.9 trillion.  Born, supra 
note 10, at 608.  By 2005, the notation value of derivatives was $454.4 trillion, which was 
more than ten times the global gross domestic product and three times the size of all 
financial assets combined.  Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction⎯Structured Finance 
and Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53, 57 (2009).  
Moreover, the global market value of OTC derivative contracts was $415 trillion by the end 
of 2007.  LYNTON JONES, CITY OF NEW LONDON, CURRENT ISSUES AFFECTING THE OTC 
DERIVATIVES MARKET AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO LONDON 5 (2009), available at 
http://217.154.230.218/NR/rdonlyres/252E99A2-7329-4C3A-B923-
A3E7060A0AC2/0/OTCDerivativesReportv2.pdf. 
 14. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street:  Understanding the Financial 
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 42 (2009) (“As of late 2008, there remained $55 trillion in 
credit-default swaps outstanding, an amount more than the gross domestic product of all the 
world nations combined.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Christopher L. Culp & Robert J. Mackay, Regulating Derivatives:  The 
Current System and Proposed Changes, 17 REG. 38 (1994) (presenting and evaluating 
appeals for regulation of derivatives); Eppel, supra note 5, at 702 (“[M]arket forces should 
be allowed to govern which products and services are offered and purchased.”); Willa E. 
Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?:  The Inadequacies of Applying the 
Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379, 381 
(1999) (“[E]xisting securities or commodities laws would stymie product development and 
prevent OTC derivatives dealers from competing effectively with foreign OTC derivatives 
dealers who are subject to less restrictive regulation.”); Merton H. Miller, Do We Really 
Need More Regulation of Financial Derivatives? (Univ. of Chi., Selected Paper No. 75, 
1994) (arguing against increased regulation).  But see, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Filling a 
Regulatory Gap:  It is Time to Regulate Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 13 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 123 (2009) (arguing for increased regulation); G. Naresh, Views of the Market 
Participants on Trading Regulations in the Derivatives Market 11 (Indian Institute of 
Capital Markets 9th Capital Markets Conference Paper, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=876877 (“[R]egulatory framework is 
required to meet the needs of ensuring market integrity, financial integrity and investor 
protection.”); Tijoe, supra note 10, at 414 (“[T]he credit derivatives industry needs a 
carefully designed infrastructure to ensure that the market’s known risks are actively 
monitored.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Loomis, supra note 4; Carol J. Loomis, The Risk that Won’t Go Away, 
FORTUNE, Mar. 7, 1994, at 40 (arguing for increased regulation); Susan M. Mangiero, 
Anyone up for OTC Derivatives Regulation?, AFP PULSE, May 2002, at 2 (arguing against 
increased regulation and stating that “[m]andatory regulation comes with a hefty price tag”). 
 17. See Greenspan 2005, supra note 1, at 6 (“[P]rivate regulation generally has proved 
far better at constraining excessive risk-taking than has government regulation.”). 
 18. See generally Moran, supra note 14, at 9 (“Between July 2007, when the credit 
crisis began, and mid-October 2008, the country’s nine largest banks and financial 
institutions marked down their valuations on loans and other troubled assets by a combined 
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played in converting a housing crisis into a banking crisis.19  For example, 
some scholars argue that the near demise of AIG was due to its exposure to 
risky derivatives.20  Others argue that the lack of meaningful regulatory 
oversight of derivatives was a central cause of the GFC.21 
At the beginning of the crisis, President George W. Bush recognized 
that our “21st century global economy remains regulated largely by 
outdated 20th century laws.”22  Financial markets are regulated by a 
“patchwork” regulatory scheme including five federal financial institution 
regulators, state banking supervision, bifurcated securities and futures 
regulation, and state insurance regulation.23  President Obama has proposed 
 
$323 billion.”).  See also id. at 10-11 (discussing the ripple effects of the global financial 
meltdown). 
 19. See id. at 32 (“The factor that levered a serious housing market bubble and collapse 
into a threat to the United States financial markets and, indeed, the world financial system, 
was the financial innovations that developed on Wall Street as a result of securitization.”).  
The innovative instruments Moran spoke of included mortgage-backed securities as well as 
derivatives.  Loomis acknowledges that derivatives were not the “central villain” in the GFC 
drama, but asserts that they “elevated the stakes.”  Loomis, supra note 4.  Others have 
described the event as a “crisis rooted fundamentally in the successes of financial innovation 
and an unprecedented complexity of financial products, which resulted from such 
innovation.”  Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century:  Some Observations 
on the “Big-Picture” Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 157, 157 (2009).  The Obama Administration terms derivatives “a major source of 
contagion through the financial sector during the crisis.”  White Paper, supra note 11, at 6.  
See also infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text (discussing the role that derivatives 
played in the GFC in more depth). 
 20. Moran outlines how AIG was forced to give the Federal Reserve a 79.9% interest in 
AIG in return for an $85 billion emergency credit line.  As Moran explains, this was made 
necessary when holders of credit-default swaps that AIG had issued demanded more 
collateral because of downgrades in credit ratings.  Moran, supra note 14, at 66-67. 
 21. See, e.g., id. at 45 (“The absence of significant regulatory controls on how 
mortgages were repackaged into larger and more complex securities served as a central 
cause of the current financial crisis.”); Damon Silvers & Heather Slavkin, The Legacy of 
Deregulation and the Financial Crisis⎯Linkages Between Deregulation in Labor Markets, 
Housing Finance Markets, and the Broader Financial Markets, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 301, 
302 (2009) ([The financial crisis] “was the all too foreseeable consequence of a series of 
policy decisions made over decades that weakened a carefully constructed economic 
regulatory structure designed in part to guard the U.S. economy against the consequences of 
radical instability in the financial markets.”); Unterman, supra note 13, at 55 (arguing that 
“a lack of or misguided regulation perpetuated the crisis”). 
 22. Address to the Nation on the National Economy, 44 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
1251, 1254 (Sept. 24, 2008).  Others have asserted that U.S. financial institutions are 
“regulated no more stringently than, say, demolition derby drivers.”  Loomis, supra note 4. 
 23. See infra notes 85-111 and accompanying text (discussing this regulatory scheme) 
and notes 185-90 and accompanying text (proposing a more unified regulatory scheme).  
See also Eppel, supra note 5, at 692 (calling the regulatory scheme “fractured and frequently 
inconsistent”); Bernard J. Karol, An Overview of Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 195, 207 (1995) (“Derivatives are regulated by a patchwork system 
based on the legal categorization of the product and the type of financial intermediary 
offering it, rather than according to a more logical economic analysis.”); Frank Partnoy, The 
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a major overhaul of financial market regulation including regulation of the 
OTC derivatives market.24  The purpose of this article is to examine the 
need for regulation of OTC derivatives markets and the current proposal. 
Specifically, in Part I, we will define derivatives, including OTC 
derivatives, and discuss how the use of derivatives contributed to the 
current global financial crisis.  In Part II, we will discuss the existing 
regulation of derivatives.  This section will compare regulation of 
exchange-traded derivatives with OTC derivatives and outline the holes in 
existing oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).  Part III will 
discuss the regulations proposed by the Obama Administration.  These 
proposals would impose capital and transparency requirements and attempt 
to reduce systemic risk25 caused by derivatives.  In Part IV, we will analyze 
the proposals and argue in support of standardization, capital requirements, 
increased disclosure, and a central clearinghouse.  Here, we will rely on 
finance literature to demonstrate how regulation of derivatives must 
balance the difficult tasks of managing risk from derivatives without 
stifling innovation.  The proposals recognize the inherent benefits of the 
myriad of derivatives and leave untouched even the most exotic among 
them.  We support this aspect of the proposal.  However, the proposed 
regulations also continue the existing bifurcated regulatory scheme with the 
SEC and CFTC sharing regulatory authority over the derivatives market. 
For these reasons, we will argue in Part V that the proposed 
regulations, while a laudable first step, are insufficient to adequately 
regulate derivatives trading.  We will conclude by arguing for one 
regulatory body, a merged SEC and CFTC.  The rationale for two separate 
 
Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 421, 429 
(2001) (“Statutory coverage is piecemeal, byzantine, and has led market participants to opt 
out of the statutory framework when dealing in the OTC markets.”).  See generally Moran, 
supra note 14, at 95-96 (discussing how the current “patchwork” regulatory scheme was not 
built to address our modern financial system). 
 24. See White Paper, supra note 11, at 4 (discussing “substantive reforms of the 
authorities and practices of regulation and supervision” as well as “a significant 
restructuring of our regulatory system”).  We will limit our discussion in this article to 
proposals related to derivatives regulation.  Perhaps the most controversial element of the 
Obama Proposal is the creation of a consumer regulatory body.  Discussion of the merits of 
such a proposal is, however, outside the scope of this article. 
 25. Although alternative definitions of systemic risk have been offered, systemic risk 
can be defined as: 
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure 
triggers (through panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets 
or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) 
resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often 
evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility. 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008). 
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regulatory bodies, which made sense when the two bodies were created, no 
longer makes sense in today’s world.  The differences between the two 
regulatory bodies are blurred.  This confusing regulatory landscape 
contributed to the GFC.  Moreover, dividing regulatory authority between 
two agencies is inefficient and too often leads to ineffective or non-existent 
regulation. 
I.  WHAT ARE DERIVATIVES AND WHY DO WE CARE? 
A. Derivatives are . . . 
Before we can understand the role that derivatives played in the GFC 
and how the lack of meaningful regulatory oversight contributed to the 
GFC, we need to understand the various types of derivatives.  Derivatives 
are financial contracts that derive their value from the value of an 
underlying asset, termed the “reference asset.”26  There are many different 
types of derivatives, including options, futures, forwards, swaps, and 
variations of these.27  Examples of underlying assets are stocks, bonds, 
indexes, commodities, interest rates, and currency exchange rates.28  Credit 
derivatives are, simply put, financial instruments whose payoffs are linked 
to changes in the credit quality of an issuer.29 
One of the simplest examples of a derivative contract is a put option.30  
 
 26. John D. Finnerty and Mark S. Brown, An Overview of Derivatives Litigation, 1994 
to 2000, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 131, 131 (2001); Kai Kramer, Aren’t We Still in the 
“Garden of the Forking Paths”? A Comment on Consolidation of the SEC and CFTC, 4 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX. L.J. 410, 417 (2004); Moran, supra note 14, at 40; Pierre-Louis, supra 
note 10, at 43; Tijoe, supra note 10, at 388.  While “[t]raditionally, a derivative contract is 
one that creates a right or an obligation for one party to buy or sell an asset to another at 
some future time[,]” the secondary market in derivatives means that the underlying asset is 
rarely exchanged between the original counterparties.  Eppel, supra note 5, at 679. 
 27. Forwards, futures, swaps, and options are off-balance sheet instruments, and have 
been collectively “analogized to ‘LEGO’s’ building blocks for children, because the 
investor can ‘build instruments from one another’ or ‘combine the instruments into larger 
creations that appear . . . altogether ‘new.’’”  Kramer, supra note 26, at 418 (quoting 
CLIFFORD SMITH, CHARLES SMITHSON & D. SYKES WILFORD, Managing Financial Risk, 
Chapter 23, THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE FINANCE 351, 351 (Joel M. Stern & Donald H. 
Chew, Jr. eds., Blackwell Publ’g 2003) (1982)). 
 28. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (explaining that the nature of the 
underlying asset is important for determining the relevant regulator, if any). 
 29. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1021.  “Credit derivatives allow a party to 
‘unbundle’ credit risk from the other risks that an investment carries.”  Lynch, supra note 
10, at 1382.  They include credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations.  See infra 
notes 43-59 and accompanying text (explaining these types of derivatives). 
 30.  
Options are contracts where one party, A, has the right to buy (or sell) a 
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When used properly, a put option can be used to effectively mitigate an 
investor’s risk.  Assume that an investor has a large portion of his portfolio 
in the common stock of a given firm.  Although the investor is confident 
about the firm’s long-term prospects, he is concerned that the volatility of 
the market might adversely impact stock prices.  To protect his investment 
from that risk, he can buy a put option for a fraction of the cost of his 
portfolio.  The put option in this case operates much like insurance.31  If the 
 
reference asset from a counterparty, B, at or before a predetermined deadline 
(“maturity date”) and at a predetermined price (“strike price”).  For this right, A 
pays B a fee (or “premium”).  If the strike price is lower than the market price, 
the option becomes more valuable to A because A can buy the reference asset 
from B at a lower price than if A buys it in the open market.  The value of an 
option, therefore, moves in correlation with the value of the reference asset. 
Tijoe, supra note 10, at 389.  A forward contract is similar to an option except that in the 
case of a forward contract, the party (Party A in the above example) is obligated to deliver 
the reference asset to the counterparty at the maturity date.  Id.  Call options are the opposite 
of put options and give “the owner the right to buy an asset at a specified future date and 
price, which is agreed upon the day of purchase . . . .”  Kramer, supra note 26, at 421.  See 
also Feder, supra note 9, at 692 (“If the option is to buy, it is a call option; if the option is to 
sell, it is a put option.”). 
  More complex derivative products are merely combinations and modifications of 
options and forward contracts.  See Eppel, supra note 5, at 680 (“[T]hese two basic trades 
form the building blocks of all other derivative products.  By modifying and combining 
options and forward contracts creatively, financial innovators have developed a variety of 
derivatives products, including futures, swaps, mortgage, and other credit derivatives.”); 
Kojima, supra note 1, at 264 (“From these basic building blocks, financial innovation has 
produced a multitude of derivative products, with labels ranging from the common-place 
and unusual—options, futures, forwards, and swaps—to the exotic and daunting—inverse 
floaters, swaptions, captions, floortions, and ‘heaven & hell bonds.’”).  See also Feder, 
supra note 9, at 691 (discussing the “basic building blocks” that are used to create OTC 
derivative products). 
 31. Both derivatives and insurance provide a way to shift risk.  See Hazen, supra note 
15, at 124-25 (“Individuals and businesses who have exposure to risk can either hedge 
against that risk with a derivatives contract or seek insurance against the losses that could 
occur if the contingencies created by the risk materialize.”). 
Derivatives were created to soften—or in the argot of Wall Street, ‘hedge’—
investment losses. For example, some of the contracts protect debt holders 
against losses on mortgage securities. (Their name comes from the fact that 
their value ‘derives’ from underlying assets like stocks, bonds and 
commodities.) Many individuals own a common derivative:  the insurance 
contract on their homes. 
On a grander scale, such contracts allow financial services firms and 
corporations to take more complex risks that they might otherwise avoid—for 
example, issuing more mortgages or corporate debt. And the contracts can be 
traded, further limiting risk but also increasing the number of parties exposed if 
problems occur. 
Peter S. Goodman, The Reckoning-Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.beearly.com/pdfFiles/Goodman9102008.pdf.  The difference between hedging, 
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price of the stock drops, the put option would gain in value, thus offsetting 
the loss and protecting the value of the investment. 
The put option could, alternatively, be used speculatively by investors 
who are willing to bet on stock prices falling.  Such speculators are lured 
by the possibility of a large gain if they are able to predict the direction and 
magnitude of the stock price movement correctly.  If, however, they predict 
incorrectly and the stock price moves in the opposite direction, these put 
options would expire as worthless and the speculative investors would lose 
all their investment. 
B. The Derivatives Market 
Derivatives can be classified as exchange-traded derivatives or over-
the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives.32  The put option described above is an 
example of an exchange-traded derivative.  For exchange-traded 
derivatives, regulated exchanges, such as the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, or the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange, act as intermediaries between the parties to the contract and 
provide orderly trading, efficiency, and transparency.33  Settlement is 
guaranteed through clearinghouses like the Options Clearing Corporation.  
With exchange-traded derivatives, the risk of a party defaulting on its 
commitment is limited due to margin requirements imposed on 
participants.34  The market for exchange-traded derivatives has grown 
 
insurance and gambling was explained by the Supreme Court of Tennessee: 
Hedging . . . is in the nature of price insurance.  The real difference between 
hedging and gambling is that the hedger has a legitimate interest to protect apart 
from the hedging transactions, while the gambler has no interest except in the 
transactions depending on the rise and fall of the market.  An insurance contract 
becomes a wager when the insured has no legitimate interest to be protected 
against the happening of the event insured against. 
Boillin-Harrison Co. v. Lewis & Co., 187 S.W.2d 17, 24 (1945).  See infra note 92 
(comparing derivatives to gambling and explaining that derivatives are not subject to 
regulation outlawing gambling). 
 32. Carolyn H. Jackson, Have you Hedged Today? The Inevitable Advent of Consumer 
Derivatives, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3205, 3211 (1999); Lynch, supra note 10, at 1375.  The 
distinction between exchange-traded and OTC derivatives is important because the 
classification determines which regulatory scheme, if any, will be applied to the transaction.  
See infra notes 85-111 and accompanying text (discussing regulation). 
 33. See George Tsetsekos & Panos Varangis, Lessons in Structuring Derivatives 
Exchanges, 15 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 85, 86 (2000) (“The primary function of a 
derivatives exchange is to facilitate the transfer of risk among economic agents by offering 
mechanisms for liquidity and price discovery.”). 
 34. In an exchange-traded future contract, both participants make a deposit (the “initial 
margin”), typically a percentage of the face value of the contract.  As the contract either 
loses or gains value, the participants pay or receive additional amounts to maintain the 
cushion of the original deposit.  Feder, supra note 9, at 733; Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate 
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considerably over the past decade, from a notional value of about $14.8 
trillion in 1998, to a high of $95 trillion in 2007, to the current level of 
$55.8 trillion.35 
Regular options and futures are more likely to be traded over regulated 
exchanges, while exotic options, forwards, and swaps36 are typically traded 
OTC.  OTC transactions exclude the exchange and are conducted privately 
between two parties, called counterparties.37  Because OTC transactions are 
not conducted through regulated exchanges, they are not subject to the 
same reporting, standardization, and margin requirements as exchange-
traded derivatives.38  This seems to enhance their popularity with investors 
 
Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities:  Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, 
Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 428 (2005); Karol, supra 
note 23, at 199; Tsetsekos & Varangis, supra note 33, at 93.  For exchange-traded 
derivatives, the margin and the position are measured regularly.  See Feder, supra note 9, at 
734 (“Margin accounts for exchange-traded derivatives will usually be marked-to-market—
which involves valuating relevant assets at prevailing market values—daily.”). 
In addition, with exchange-traded derivatives, the exchange assumes the default risk and 
acts as the counterparty on each derivative.  Moreover, the exchange also regulates each 
contract agreement and imposes standardization.  Id. at 731 (discussing the “high degree of 
standardization” of exchange-traded derivatives); Karol, supra note 23, at 198-199 (noting 
that it is in the best interest of the exchange to regulate such contracts because the exchange 
acts as the counterparty). 
 35. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, QUARTERLY REVIEW, A108 tbl.23A (June 2009), 
available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/extderiv.htm. 
 36. Swaps are derivative instruments in “which parties agree to exchange a series of 
payments over time.”  Eppel, supra note 5, at 680.  Interest rate and currency swaps are 
common examples of swaps, which can be further sub-divided into what are termed “plain-
vanilla” or more exotic swaps.  Karol, supra note 23, at 199-200.  See infra notes 43-49 and 
accompanying text (discussing credit default swaps). 
 37. Counterparties can be classified as either dealers or end users.  Dealers act as 
intermediaries to provide derivatives to end users.  Common dealers are commercial banks, 
large corporations and hedge funds.  End users are typically corporations, institutional 
investors and financial institutions.  Eppel, supra note 5, at 682; Kojima, supra note 1, at 
266. 
 38. See Hazen, supra note 34, at 429 (“On the other hand, the over-the-counter 
derivatives markets do not impose margin requirements.”); Karol, supra note 23, at 199 
(discussing how OTC products are not subject to position limits, initial or variation 
margins).  Moreover, OTC transactions are undisclosed beyond the participants. 
Unlike the more standardized exchange-traded derivatives, derivatives traded in the OTC 
market can be easily tailored to the individual needs of the market participants.  See Julie 
Baumgarten, Who Patrols the Money? The Regulation of Off-Exchange Foreign Currency 
Options:  Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 21 HOUST. J. INT’L L. 151, 157 
(1998) (“Unlike organized exchanges, OTC markets enable investors to make customized 
agreements subject to individual negotiation.”); Feder, supra note 9, at 735 (“[P]arties to 
OTC transactions can tailor individual derivatives to specific exposures or for specific risk 
postures.”); Lynch, supra note 10, at 1375-76 (“The OTC market for derivatives consists of 
parties entering into contracts directly with each other, where they have the ability to 
formulate transactions that are exactly tailored to their respective needs. This allows for 
much more innovation and variation, because the parties can negotiate the specific details of 
the deal directly with each other.”).  See also Wynkoop, supra note 2, at 3098 (noting that 
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and hedge funds.39  Hence, the OTC market is about thirty-times larger than 
the exchange-traded derivatives market in terms of notional value.  In fact, 
the market for OTC derivatives grew from $72.13 trillion in 1998, peaked 
at $683.37 trillion in 2008, and as of last estimates (December 2008), 
currently stands at $591.96 trillion.40  Because the vast majority of OTC 
transactions are settled bilaterally between the counterparties, rather than 
through clearing houses,41 there is no central counterparty similar to what 
exists for exchange-traded derivatives.  Therefore, OTC derivatives are 
subject to significant counterparty (default) risk.  Upon the expiration of 
the contract, the counterparties to the contract must be able to fulfill their 
obligations in order for the transaction to be completed.42 
An example of an OTC derivative is the credit default swap 
(“CDS”).43  A CDS is a contract conducted between two parties, where the 
underlying asset is the credit or creditworthiness of a borrower (debt 
issuer).44  If a credit event45 occurs, the protection buyer will be 
 
the OTC derivatives market “is a noncentralized market composed of individualized, 
privately negotiated contracts”).  Hence, their “complexities depend upon the wishes of the 
parties.”  Karol, supra note 23, at 199. 
 39. See Lynch, supra note 10, at 1379 (“[T]he lack of regulation allowed the OTC 
market to develop quickly through innovation while the exchange-traded market was stifled 
by persistent adherence to custom and remained rooted in traditional derivative 
instruments.”). 
 40. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, QUARTERLY REVIEW, A103 tbl.19 (June 2009), 
available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm.  To put these numbers in perspective, 
the U.S. gross domestic product grew from 8.8 trillion in 1998 to 14.3 trillion in 2008.  
BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT 




 41. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, Report on OTC Derivatives:  Settlement Procedures 
and Counterparty Risk Management, CGFS Publications No. 8 (September 1998), available 
at http://www.bis.org/publ/ecsc08.htm. 
 42. See Kojima, supra note 1, at 266 (“The absence of a central market also means 
there is no clearinghouse–the ability of buyer or seller to fulfill the terms of their contract 
therefore becomes more important for the OTC market participants.”).  See also Feder, 
supra note 9, at 735 (“Moreover, in off-exchange transactions the credit risks generally are 
not absorbed by an exchange. . . . [A]n OTC derivatives contract party must pay relatively 
close attention to the possibility that the counterparty will fail to make good on 
obligations.”).  The protection seller’s credit risk is the risk that the agreement will not be 
performed.  This is termed “counterparty risk.”  Kim, supra note 3, at 730-31. 
 43. See FRANK J. FABOZZI, BOND MARKETS, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGIES 727-32 (6th ed. 
2006) (discussing the mechanics of a credit default swap). 
 44. A swap is a “complex way of stringing together a series of forward contracts” or a 
“side agreement based on the value of the underlying asset.”  Kramer, supra note 26, at 420.  
A credit default swap is a “bilateral financial contract in which a protection buyer makes 
periodic payments to . . . the protection seller, in return for a contingent payment if a 
predefined credit event occurs in the reference credit . . . .”  Eternity Global Master Fund 
Ltd. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal 
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compensated by the protection seller.  In other words, the protection seller 
will assume the loan from the protection buyer at face value.46  For 
example, if Bank X makes a large loan to a corporation, the bank may 
decide to reduce its risk exposure by syndicating the loan and including 
other banks.  This, however, would reduce Bank X’s balance sheet and its 
profits.  If the terms of the loan are especially attractive, the bank may 
instead decide not to share the risk/reward with other banks.  It could 
instead transfer the default risk by entering into a CDS agreement with a 
third party.  The CDS is similar to an insurance contract:  X bank will make 
premium payments47 to the third party (protection seller), and in the event 
that the borrower defaults on the loan, the protection seller will reimburse 
the bank for the amount of the loss.  The advantages of the CDS are that it 
allows the protection buyer to reduce its risk exposure and at the same time 
get access to credit markets that might be restricted or off-limits because of 
regulation.48  This has lead to an exponential growth in the CDS market 
over the past five years.  The market has increased from a notional value of 
$6.4 trillion (2004) to a high of $57.9 trillion (2007).  The market is 
currently estimated at $41.9 trillion (2008).49 
 
quotations omitted).  The primary buyers of CDSs are commercial lenders and corporate 
bond holders; the primary sellers are insurance companies and large financial institutions.  
Lynch, supra note 10, at 1384. 
Partnoy and Skeel define a credit default swap as a “private contract in which private parties 
bet on a debt issuer’s bankruptcy, default, or restructuring.” (emphasis added).  Partnoy & 
Skeel, supra note 8, at 1021.  The use of the word “bet” conjures up visions of gambling.  
See infra note 92 (discussing the comparison between derivative use and gambling). 
 45. The credit event is the event that triggers performance of the contract terms.  See 
Kim, supra note 3, at 754 (“The ‘credit event’ becomes the standard for triggering the 
performance of the contract terms previously agreed upon by the parties.”).  The 
International Swaps and Derivative Association (“ISDA”) defines credit events to include 
bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation default, obligation acceleration, 
repudiation/moratorium, and restructuring.  Derivatives Consulting Group Glossary, INT’L 
SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/oper_commit-dcg-
glossary.html.  The triggering credit events can be specified in the contract.  See Kim, supra 
note 3 (discussing issues related to credit events). 
 46. The face value is the notional principal in this example. 
 47. The default protection buyer makes quarterly payments to the protection seller.  
This “spread” is quoted in terms of basis points.  On a 5-year CDS with a notional principal 
of $10 million, 120 basis points per year would amount to $120,000.  The notional principal 
is the face value of the loan or bonds for which protection is being purchased.  See Dominic 
O'Kane & Stuart Turnbull, Valuation of Credit Default Swaps, FIXED INCOME 
QUANTITATIVE CREDIT RESEARCH (Lehman Bros.), Apr. 2003 (discussing the valuation of 
credit default swaps).  See also JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 
(7th ed. 2008) (providing an expansive discussion of credit default swaps). 
 48. Tijoe, supra note 10, at 392. 
 49. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, QUARTERLY REVIEW, A103 tbl.19 (June 2009), 
available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm.  In 2004, the CDS market represented 
two-thirds of the entire credit derivatives market.  Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in 
the Capital Markets:  Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 
D'SOUZAFINALIZED_FIVE 3/31/2010  2:04:18 AM 
2010] PROPOSED REGULATIONS OF OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET 485 
 
To understand the GFC and the role that derivatives played in creating 
the crisis, we need to understand another category of credit derivatives, the 
collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”).50  Collateralized debt obligations 
fall under the umbrella of structured asset-backed securities.51  Asset-
backed securities derive their value from a portfolio of underlying assets, 
such as mortgages, corporate bonds, credit card debt, or auto loans.  These 
are housed within a special purpose vehicle/entity (“SPV”), which is a trust 
that slices up the debt into smaller pieces and issues securities.  These 
securities receive the cash flows from the underlying assets, which pass 
through to the SPV.52  The assets serve as collateral to back up the 
securities.  The securities are often issued in “tranches,” with the first 
(equity) tranche bearing the most risk and subsequently receiving the most 
compensation.  The second (mezzanine) tranche53 is typically rated BBB 
and the third (senior) tranche is the most insulated from risk of default 
(typically rated AAA) and, hence, receives the lowest return.54 
 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 169 (2007).  It has been called the “fastest-growing 
financial market there is.”  Jenny Anderson, Calm Before and During a Storm; Derivatives 
May Put the New York Fed Chief Through a Stress Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at C1. 
 50. See FABOZZI, supra 43, at 348. 
 51. Aaron Unterman uses a story of an apple farm to explain the concept of asset 
securitization.  Unterman, supra note 13, at 58-60.  In this story, the residents of Appleville 
have enjoyed five years of perfect summers, with their apple production increasing each 
year.  Believing that “the sun would never stop shining,” IB Farms offers the farmers of 
Appleville money today for the right to apples from future crops.  Id. at 59.  The farmers use 
this money to buy more land and machinery.  IB Farms sells these apples and rights to 
future apples to supermarkets worldwide.  As Unterman tells us, “[a]ny doubts about 
reliability . . . could be quickly allayed by the team of local weathermen who were only to 
[sic] happy to evaluate crops and make assurances to their reliability (for a small fee of 
course).”  Id.  In this story, the apple trees are the wealth-producing assets and the future 
apples are the source of wealth for sale.  As Unterman describes it, the benefit of this type of 
arrangement is that the farmers have access to immediate cash and the risk of a crop failure 
is borne largely by IB Farms and, more commonly, the supermarkets worldwide that agree 
to assume the risk.  Id.  In spite of the fact that the supermarkets bore the risk for crop 
failure, they did nothing to monitor the apple farms.  Instead, they entered into agreements 
with third parties who agreed to compensate for any shortfalls in apple production.  These 
third parties are monocline bond insurers who, unlike typical insurance companies, are not 
required by law to keep capital reserves.  Id. at 62-63.  Because the farmers were virtually 
assured of the sale of their apples, they began to disregard sound farming practices, using 
lower quality seeds and cutting corners.  Id. at 64. 
 52. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1022 (“[A] collateralized debt obligation (CDO) 
is a pool of debt contracts housed within a special purpose entity (SPE) whose capital 
structure is sliced and resold based on differences in credit quality.”). 
 53. The mezzanine tranche “formed the backbone of the CDO market.”  Unterman, 
supra note 13, at 61. 
 54. Investors in this tranche are the first to receive principal and interest payments and 
are insulated from loss by the tranches below them.  Unterman, supra note 13, at 61.  See 
also, Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 21, at 336-37 (discussing the use of “multi-tiered capital 
structures so that investors that owned interests in different tiers of the structure had 
different rights to cash flows generated by the pool.  In most circumstances, this meant that 
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CDOs vary depending upon the type of security that is the underlying 
asset.  If corporate bonds are the underlying asset, the CDO is called a 
collateralized bond obligation (“CBO”).  By contrast, a collateralized loan 
obligation (“CLO”) is backed by loans and a collateralized mortgage 
obligation (“CMO”) is backed by mortgage-backed securities.55  When 
CDOs are backed by a combination of underlying assets they are called 
multi-sector CDOs.  There are also classes of CDOs, called CDO-squared 
(“CDO2”), which are CDOs backed by other CDO tranches.56  These allow 
the purchasers of CDO securities to resell the risk that they have assumed. 
CDOs that are backed by a portfolio of debt instruments, like CLOs 
and CBOs, are called cash CDOs.57  In these cases, the SPV actually owns 
the portfolio of outstanding debt and it passes along the payments that it 
receives to its investors.  In a different class of CDOs, where the SPV does 
not hold actual loans or bonds, the collateral consists of a portfolio of a 
series of short positions in CDOs into which the SPV has entered.  The 
credit risks and payments received from protection buyers are passed on to 
the investors in each of the tranches according to the risk that they bear.  
These classes of CDOs are called synthetic CDOs.58  In a synthetic CDO, 
the value of each tranche is determined based upon complex financial 
models.  This creates greater uncertainty because the effect of a default is 
unclear and it is not clear whether the tranche is priced accurately.59 
 Thus, the complexity of the various types of derivatives is apparent.  
This complexity contributed to the GFC because it increased the difficultly 
 
the highest level or tranche had the senior-most interest in the pool and was paid the lowest 
interest rate and the junior-most interest holder was paid the highest interest rate.”); Lynch, 
supra note 10, at 1386 (discussing how “[t]his allows the CDO to reap a competitive return 
on its investments that far exceeds the return of the senior tranche, and while this return may 
be equal to or even lower than the return on the equity tranche, it is calculated on a much 
higher notional amount, thereby outpacing the return due to the lower tranches.”). 
 55. Mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) are asset-backed securities where mortgage 
loans comprise the underlying asset.  FABOZZI, supra note 43, at 246. 
 56. There also exist CDO-cubed (CDO3), which are basically CDO2 tranches 
repackaged in a new CDO, and CDOn that show the depth into which these securities can be 
repackaged. 
 57. Tijoe, supra note 10, at 393. 
 58. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1022 (“In a ‘synthetic’ CDO, the SPE does 
not purchase actual bonds, but instead typically enters into several credit default swaps with 
a third party or parties to create synthetic exposure to the outstanding debt issued by a range 
of companies.  The SPE then issues financial instruments, which are backed by credit 
default swaps rather than any actual bonds.”); Tijoe, supra note 10, at 392-93 (“In synthetic 
CDO’s, the underlying debt instruments are credit default swaps.”). 
 59. Tijoe, supra note 10, at 393.  See also Karol, supra note 23, at 198 (explaining that 
creation of the Black-Scholes formula for pricing options was a major factor in the 
explosion of derivative innovation and trading); Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1040-46 
(discussing the uncertainty created by the mathematical models used to price the CDO 
tranches). 
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with which even sophisticated investors could properly assess their risks.60  
In addition, the CDOs were typically held by banks as off-balance-sheet 
assets.  This also made it difficult for even sophisticated investors to 
effectively assess their risks, especially given the fact that they were often 
considered by the rating agencies to be AAA quality.61 
C. The Current Financial Crisis 
As we have seen, derivatives are essential to the economy and 
specifically, the functioning of financial markets because they are 
invaluable tools to help manage risk.  They can be used as a hedge against 
potential losses from unpredictable changes in commodity and financial 
markets.  If used properly, derivatives can effectively transfer risk.62  They 
allow banks to transfer credit exposure to counterparties and off of their 
own balance sheets, which allows banks to lend more money.63  However, 
when derivatives are used improperly, they magnify losses and spread 
risk.64  That is essentially what happened in today’s financial crisis. 
 
 60. See, e.g., Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 21, at 337 (discussing the fact that buying in 
tranches “made it difficult, if not impossible, for even the most sophisticated investors to 
perform proper due diligence”).  In fact, even Warren Buffett acknowledged difficulty in 
understanding derivatives.  He stated, “[w]hen Charlie and I finish reading the long 
footnotes detailing the derivatives activities of major banks, the only thing we understand is 
that we don’t understand how much risk the institution is running.”  2002 Berkshire 
Hathaway Annual Report, supra note 6, at 15.  Buffett further noted that derivatives were 
getting increasingly difficult to monitor and control.  Id. 
The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will 
almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some event makes their 
toxicity clear.  Knowledge of how dangerous they are has already permeated the 
electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption of major troubles caused 
the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically.  Elsewhere, however, the 
derivatives business continues to expand unchecked.  Central banks and 
governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the 
risks posed by these contracts. 
Id. 
 61. Jones, supra note 13, at 21.  See infra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing 
the impact of credit rating agencies on the GFC). 
 62. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1023 (discussing the various benefits of credit 
derivatives, including the benefit of hedging as well as “several additional benefits, 
including increased liquidity in the credit markets, contractual standardization, and the 
valuable signals provided by credit derivatives for other market participants”).  See also, 
Kramer, supra note 26, at 423-25 (identifying the benefits of derivatives as avoiding risk, 
hedging, and reducing transaction costs); Pierre-Louis, supra note 10, at 47-48 (“Ironically, 
derivatives, when properly employed, do not present any greater risk than other financial 
instruments.”). 
 63. Tijoe, supra note 10, at 394. 
 64. It has been argued, in addition, that credit default swaps reduce the incentives and 
need for banks to monitor borrowers.  Feder, supra note 9, at 690 (“Traditionally, an 
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To some extent, the current financial crisis began as a housing crisis.  
There was tremendous growth in the real estate market from 2000 to 2006.  
In 2004, Federal Reserve chairman, Alan Greenspan, urged borrowers to 
enter the housing market, and strongly advocated the use of adjustable rate 
mortgages.65  He argued that “homeowners might have saved tens of 
thousands of dollars had they held adjustable-rate mortgages66 rather than 
fixed-rate mortgages during the past decade.”67  A homebuyer may use an 
adjustable rate mortgage to acquire a more expensive home than he or she 
may have been able to afford using a fixed rate mortgage, because the rate 
for the initial years is set to artificially low levels (known as “teaser rates”). 
This set the stage for appreciation in housing prices.  The median sale 
price of homes in the U.S. increased from $169,000 in 2000 to $246,500 in 
the year 2006, a 45.85% increase.68  The speed of the upward movement in 
house prices was unprecedented.69  Borrowing rates were low and credit 
was easy to obtain.  Most importantly for the purpose of this article, the 
securitization of mortgages (and other debt obligations) ensured that banks 
and mortgage banks could decouple the origination and servicing aspects of 
 
expectant firm minimizes its credit risk by monitoring the credit health of its debtors and 
tailoring the amount of unsecured credit it would extend to such debtors. . . . Credit 
derivatives now offer an alternative.”); Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1033 (“And since 
banks are often particularly well-positioned to monitor—due, among other things, to their 
sophistication and the access they have to the details of a debtor’s finances—the use of 
credit default swaps can neutralize a very good monitor . . . . Overall this situation suggests 
that credit default swaps may reduce monitoring oversight, and their use can lead to moral 
hazard on the part of borrowers who are subject to less financial discipline from their 
lenders.”).  Perversely, some argue that in certain cases a lender that purchased credit 
default swaps and who will benefit more if a borrowing company defaults than if it does not, 
might actually use its monitoring power to encourage default.  Partnoy and Skeel term this 
type of lender a “Darth Vader monitor.”  Id. at 1035.  See supra text accompanying note 10 
(discussing the risks of derivatives). 
 65. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Credit Union 
National Association 2004 Governmental Affairs Conference, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 23, 
2004), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040223/default.htm. 
 66. Adjustable rate mortgages are typically cheaper than fixed rate mortgages because 
the borrower is exposed to an upward movement in interest rates.  An increase in interest 
rates would send the borrower’s payments higher. 
 67. Greenspan, supra note 65. 
 68. Median and Average Sales Prices of New Homes Sold in United States, U.S. 
Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/const/uspriceann.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
 69. The speed of the appreciation can be gauged by the fact that it took double that 
amount of time for prices to increase by that percentage, prior to the year 2000.  The median 
sale price of homes in the U.S. was $112,500 in 1988 and increased to $169,000 in the year 
2000.  Id.  It is also clear that the increase in house prices was not due to a corresponding 
increase in household income.  Median annual household incomes increased from $50,732 
in 2000 to $58,407 in the year 2006, an increase of only 15.12%.  Table F-5, Race and 
Hispanic Origin of Householder—Families by Median and Mean Income:  1947 to 2007, 
Historical Income Tables–Families, U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/f05.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
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mortgages.  In other words, after the mortgage was originated, the bank or 
mortgage bank could sell the mortgage into a pool of mortgage-backed 
securities and obtain capital to originate additional mortgages.  Hence, the 
banks and mortgage banks did not have to bear the credit risk of the 
mortgages that they issued.  The originated mortgages were sold as MBSs 
(or CDOs in the form of CMOs) and housed in SPVs that then issued 
securities with the mortgages as collateral.70  The senior tranche was 
typically given the highest credit rating71 and the mezzanine tranches were 
typically rated between BBB and B.  The conventional wisdom was that 
“all housing is local”72 and, thus, just like any other diversified portfolio, 
the pool of MBS securities or CDO securities would be resilient to a 
housing downturn in one or a few parts of the country.  CDOs comprised of 
the riskiest tranches were created and re-bundled in a way that still allowed 
the upper 80% of the structure to be rated AAA.  This disguised the fact 
that the underlying assets were largely subprime.73 
Once housing prices began to rise, there was added pressure on 
mortgage originators to get contracts signed and have the mortgages 
securitized via CDOs that were sold into SPVs.74  The earlier prudent 
practice of having a borrower put down 20% towards the purchase of the 
 
 70. CDOs on asset-backed securities were sold to many banks via SPVs.  These CDOs 
were held by banks as off-balance sheet assets.  Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Structured 
Products:  Implications for Financial Markets, 93 FIN. MARKET TRENDS 27, 33 (2007); 
Jones, supra note 13, at 7. 
 71. An AAA rating by Standard & Poors indicated that these investments were as safe 
as U.S. Treasury bonds.  As Unterman explains, “[t]he essential question which underlies 
the credit crisis is how loans to individuals with poor credit histories (which often originated 
without credit checks or down-payments) were transformed into investments that the market 
trusted as being as reliable at government securities.”  Unterman, supra note 13, at 58. 
 72. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 
http://www.nahb.org/NAHB_History/ba_working.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
 73. Unterman, supra note 13, at 69 (“This magical transformation was achieved in spite 
of the fact that the underlying securities belonged largely to the lowest rated tranches of the 
original subprime securitizations.”). 
 74. See Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 21, at 328-29 (discussing the way this pressure 
led to creation of innovative financial products to grow the mortgage market).  “This long-
term decline in the regulation of the mortgage industry, and in particular, the boom in 
unregulated non-GSE financed lending after 2001, set the stage for an explosion of high 
cost, exotic mortgage products offered to subprime borrowers.”  Id. at 328.  Credit 
derivatives were used to solve the “credit paradox” or the “clash between the interests of the 
bank’s loan officer, who is interested in creating new loans, and the credit risk manager, 
who seeks to manage the credit risk portfolio . . . .”  Kim, supra note 3, at 719-20.  In many 
ways, this was the classic “bubble” that “cause[s] credit standards to ease as lenders become 
less concerned about the ability of the borrowers to repay loans and instead rely on further 
appreciation of the asset to shield themselves from losses.”  Unterman, supra note 13, at 54 
(quoting Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., How Should We Respond to 
Asset Price Bubbles? (May 15, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080515a.htm). 
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house was for the most part ignored.  NINJA (No Income No Job or Asset) 
loans or “liar loans,” where borrowers were not asked to provide proof of 
their capacity to repay the loan, were offered.  Subprime lending became 
the norm.75  Interest-only mortgages, such as balloon payment mortgages, 
were also issued.  Besides the cash flow CDOs being traded, synthetic 
CDOs were also created and sold to investors.  The investors in these 
securities were from all over the world.  The general feeling at that time 
was that the housing market would continue its upward trend or that it had 
reached a permanently high plateau.  Of course, as we now know, the trend 
would reverse. 
This “bubble” finally ended in 2007, and as housing prices began to 
plunge, many of the subprime borrowers could not make their payments 
and defaulted on their loans.  This caused a ripple effect, resulting in 
holders of asset-backed securities losing their payments and their 
investments.76  Many mortgage lenders were forced to close immediately as 
the MBS market stalled.77  The CDO and CDS markets, which had grown 
tremendously over the past six years, were now hard hit by the downturn in 
housing.  As borrowers defaulted, the protection buyers demanded 
compensation from their counterparties.  However, the protection sellers 
were not all adequately capitalized and were unable to make such large 
payments.  Furthermore, as investors moved their investments away from 
housing based investments and into safer investments,78 it became 
 
 75. Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 21, at 328 (“In 2001, subprime lending represented 
7.2% of mortgage originations but exploded over the next five years until they reached 20% 
of mortgage originations in 2006.”).  In addition, subprime mortgages without 
documentation of the borrower’s income, assets or employment grew to 44% of the 
subprime market by 2005.  Id. at 329. 
 76. The housing crisis became a credit crisis amplifying the overall crisis.  SEC 
Chairman Cox recognized this connection in his testimony before Congress, stating: 
The packaging of risky mortgages into complex structured securities with AAA 
ratings spread the risks into the securities markets, and what significantly 
amplified this crisis around the globe was the parallel market in credit default 
swaps, which is completely unregulated.  Credit default swaps multiplied the 
risk of the failure of bad mortgages by orders of magnitude.  And they ensured 
that when housing prices collapsed, the effects cascaded throughout the 
financial system. 
The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 22 (2008) (statement of Christopher Cox, 
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n). 
 77. Since the latter part of 2006, 371 major U.S. lending operations have closed.  
Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter, http://ml-implode.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
 78. Finance literature refers to this as the flight to quality.  Flight to quality, or the 
contagion effect, is used to describe the actions of investors in a market that is beset with 
uncertainty.  Investors will sell risky holdings and move their money to safer securities like 
Treasuries.  See generally Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler & Simon Gilchrist, The Financial 
Accelerator and the Flight to Quality, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (1996) (demonstrating that 
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extremely difficult to raise fresh capital from investors.  The CDO market 
was effectively decimated.  By October 2007, 186 CDOs with over $200 
billion in assets had failed.79  Some of the most prominent firms had traded 
in asset-backed securities, credit default swaps and other derivatives, and 
were the hardest hit by the subprime crisis.  For example, Bear Stearns was 
eventually taken over by J.P. Morgan Chase; Lehmann Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy; and AIG was bailed out by the Federal Reserve.  Large losses 
from CDOs were implicated in both the AIG and Lehmann Brothers 
failures.  In fact, the CDO losses represented 94% of AIG’s total loss.80 
The potential for a global financial meltdown is exactly the type of 
“systemic risk” that has been recognized as a potential risk in derivative 
use.81  A bank’s failure to meet its obligations could leave its counterparty 
unable to make payments, thus leading to a domino effect as defaults are 
transferred from one institution to another.  The fact that derivatives 
transactions are concentrated in a small number of interconnected 
institutions renders the fears of systemic risk more serious.82  Some feared a 
“derivatives tsunami” that would lead to a series of bank failures and a 
worldwide credit crisis.83 
 
flight to quality also occurs in credit markets). 
 79. Unterman, supra note 13, at 71. 
 80. Jones, supra 13, at 9.  Losses associated with CDSs paled in comparison.  For 
example, in AIG’s case, the firm had CDSs with a notional value of 180 billion pounds and 
the actual losses from the CDSs were under 2 billion pounds.  Id.  The CDS losses were 
approximately 6% of the total losses for the firm.  By contrast, AIG had a $196 billion 
notional value of CDOs on ABSs with actual losses of over $31 billion.  Id. 
 81. Feder, supra note 9, at 730 (“For those who fear systemic risk, OTC derivatives are 
ironic; the purpose of derivatives is to manage risk at a micro level, but their effect is to 
increase risk at a macro level.”); Omarova, supra note 19, at 162 (“The financial crisis also 
drew attention to a hidden paradox:  while this virtually limitless ‘slicing and dicing’ of 
financial risk may decrease risk exposure for individual market players, it tends to increase 
the overall riskiness and vulnerability of the financial system.”); Silver & Slavkin, supra 
note 21, at 338 (“The CDS markets became the unseen glue that linked the world’s financial 
institutions to one another and, according to some reports it was Bear Stearns’ activities in 
the CDS markets that led regulators to believe it was too interconnected to fail.”); Wynkoop, 
supra note 2, at 3105 (“Due to the size of the credit derivatives market, the network of 
parties within it, and its sensitivity to liquidity shocks, it makes a substantial contribution to 
systemic risk.”). 
 82. See Eppel, supra note 5, at 688-689 (discussing the dangers of systemic risk).  See 
also Feder, supra note 9, at 729. (“Thus, active derivatives trading generates a web of 
transactions and credit exposures, as party after party seeks to pass off some of the market 
or credit risk it has obtained under a derivatives transaction via another derivatives 
transaction, until a complex network of financial inter-dependencies arises among many 
financial institutions.”); Omarova, supra note 19 (emphasizing the dangers stemming from 
the high degree of interconnectedness). 
 83. See Mara Der Hovanesian, Taking Risk to the Extremes:  Will Derivatives Cause a 
Major Blowup in the World’s Credit Markets?, BUS. WK., May 23, 2005, at 96. 
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II.  HOW ARE DERIVATIVES CURRENTLY REGULATED? 
A. Current Regulation Scheme 
 As outlined above,84 there are many types of derivatives, thus 
making the discussion of their regulation challenging.  Some types of 
derivatives are regulated by the CFTC;85 some types of derivatives are 
regulated by the SEC.86  However, the bulk of derivatives remain 
unregulated.87  This lack of oversight was intentional.88  In 2000, Congress 
 
 84. See supra notes 27-59 and accompanying text (outlining the different kinds of 
derivatives). 
 85. The CFTC was created in 1974 by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Act under amendment to the Commodities Exchange Act.  Kramer, supra note 26, at 427.  It 
has authority to regulate “all transactions involving contractual agreements providing for the 
sale of a commodity for future delivery.”  Gibson, supra note 15, at 389.  National futures 
and commodity exchanges, as well as futures and options on futures, are within its 
regulatory purview.  Culp & MacKay, supra note 15; Eppel, supra note 5, at 689 (“futures 
are subject to the control of the CFTC”); Hazen, supra note 15, at 124 (“Derivative (futures 
and option) contracts are publicly traded on the various commodity exchanges subject to 
federal regulation by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).”).  Moreover, 
the Chicago Board of Options Trading and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange exercise 
significant control, as self-regulatory organizations, over the trading in the futures market.  
Kramer, supra note 26, at 423. 
 86. The SEC has the power to regulate trade in securities and the securities exchanges.  
The SEC, thus, has the power to regulate derivatives where the underlying asset is a 
security.  For example, the SEC has the authority to regulate currency options, stock 
options, and options on stock indexes.  Culp & Mackay, supra note 15; Hazen, supra note 
15, at 124 (“Derivatives based on securities and related financial instruments are publicly 
traded on the securities exchanges which are regulated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).”). 
 87. The law can regulate behavior either by statute or by private causes of action.  This 
article focuses on statutory regulation.  Although outside the scope of this article, in the 
advent of the GFC, a number of lawsuits have been initiated alleging either negligence or 
fraud in the management and purchase of derivatives.  See, e.g., Unterman, supra note 13, at 
79-81 (discussing the various lawsuits).  See generally Finnerty & Brown, supra note 26 
(discussing the various bases upon which derivative based lawsuits can be brought:  
including securities fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty); 
Partnoy, supra note 23, at 446-78 (outlining the judicial treatment of derivatives disputes).  
Lawsuits concerning derivatives have, in fact, been rare.  It has been asserted that they are 
“virtually unsullied by the foul touch of litigation.”  Schwartz, supra note 49, at 173 
(quoting Robert D. Aicher et al., Credit Enhancement:  Letters of Credit, Guaranties, 
Insurance and Swaps (The Clash of Cultures), 59 BUS. LAW. 897, 898 (2004)). 
 88. See, e.g., Tijoe, supra note 10, at 394-98 (discussing the history of derivative 
regulation).  See also Jake Keaveny, In Defense of Market Self-Regulation:  An Analysis of 
the History of Futures Regulation and the Trend Toward Demutualization, 70 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1419, 1422-38 (2005) (outlining the legislative history of futures regulation); Zachary 
T. Knepper, Examining the Merits of Dual Regulation for Single-Stock Futures:  How the 
Divergent Insider Trading Regimes for Federal Futures and Securities Markets 
Demonstrate the Necessity for (And Virtual Inevitability of) Dual CFTC-SEC Regulation for 
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enacted the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”)89 which 
explicitly exempted OTC derivatives from regulation by the CFTC90 and 
limited their regulation by the SEC.91  The CFMA also preempted state and 
 
Single-Stock Futures, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 33 (2004) (discussing how jurisdiction disputes 
between the SEC and CFTC were resolved by the Shad-Johnson Accord which trifurcated 
securities and futures regulation); Partnoy, supra note 23, at 435-46 (discussing what he 
terms the “complex history” of OTC derivatives regulation). 
 89. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A0365 (codified in various 
sections of 7, 11, 12 and 15 U.S.C.).  The CFMA was designed: 
(6) to promote innovation for futures and derivatives and to reduce systemic risk 
by enhancing legal certainty in the markets for certain futures and derivatives 
transactions; 
(7) to reduce systemic risk and provide greater stability to markets during times 
of market disorder by allowing the clearing of transactions in over-the-counter 
derivatives through appropriately regulated clearing organizations; and 
(8) to enhance the competitive position of the United States financial 
institutions and financial markets. 
CFMA, § 2 (Purposes).  See William J. Brodsky, New Legislation Permitting Stock Futures: 
The Long and Winding Road, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 573, 574-77 (2001); Lynch, supra 
note 10, at 1376; Pierre-Louis, supra note 10, (analyzing the legislative histories of the 
Commodity Exchange Act and the CFMA); see also Baumgarten, supra note 38 (discussing 
the confusion with respect to regulatory authority that existed prior to the enactment of the 
CFMA).  The CFMA has been described as “the culmination of three years of congressional 
effort.”  Eppel, supra note 5, at 700. 
The subject of derivative regulation has been debated in Congress for decades.  In 1994 
regulation was proposed.  Congress considered the Derivatives Safety and Soundness 
Supervision Act, the Derivative Limitation Act, the Derivatives Supervision Act, and a 
GAO Report recommending regulation.  See generally Culp & MacKay, supra note 15 
(noting the provisions of those proposals). 
 90. The CFMA exempts OTC derivative transactions as long as the parties are “eligible 
contract participants” that are negotiating contracts for excluded or exempt commodities.  
Eligible contract participants are wealthy investors or sophisticated institutional investors.  
Interest rates, exchange rates, currencies, securities, security indices, and credit risks are 
examples of excluded commodities.  Lynch, supra note 10, at 1378-79.  Prior to enactment 
of the CFMA, the various commodity contract markets approved the economic integrity of 
each contract that was traded.  Hazen, supra note 15, at 129.  After passage of the CFMA, 
the CFTC no longer had the responsibility for reviewing the economics underlying each 
publically traded derivative.  Id. 
 91. White Paper, supra note 11, at 47; Moran, supra note 14, at 42.  The CFMA 
provided that “swap agreements,” including credit-default swaps, were not securities within 
the meaning of federal securities laws.  See Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 302(a), 303(a) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-1, 78c-1).  See Securities Act of 1933 § 2A, 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1(a) 
(2006) (providing that “[t]he definition of ‘security’ in section 77b(a)(1) of this title does not 
include any non-security based swap agreement . . .”).  Security-based agreements, while 
not securities either, are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts.  Hazen, 
supra note 15, at 123 n.2. 
Arguably, credit derivatives fail the four-prong Howey test set forth by the Supreme Court 
in SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).  See generally Gibson, supra note 15, 
at 393-400 (applying the Howey test to swaps); Kojima, supra note 1, at 298-305 (applying 
the Howey test to OTC derivatives); Pierre-Louis, supra note 10 (applying the Howey test to 
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local laws regarding gambling92 and bucket shops93 from being enforced in 
respect to these derivatives.94  Moreover, although the nature of the OTC 
derivative is similar to insurance, they are not regulated by state insurance 
laws.95  As a result, most of the types of derivatives that were involved in 
the GFC are unregulated.  For example, the credit-default and CDO 
markets are wholly unregulated.  They operate in what has been termed a 
dark market,96 without public disclosure requirements, without reserve or 
 
foreign currency options); Tijoe, supra note 10, at 396-97 (applying the Howey test to credit 
derivatives). 
 92. See generally Hazen, supra note 15, at 126 (comparing illegal gambling to 
derivatives).  Hazen writes: 
The parallel between illegal gambling and permissible derivatives is 
demonstrated by the following example.  Consider two inveterate gamblers who 
make a wager on whether it will rain the next day.  This contract would be 
illegal under the law of most states.  Compare this gamble with a farmer who is 
concerned about a predicted drought and wants to hedge against the loss of 
crops by entering into a derivatives contract based on corn.  This is legal as a 
forward or futures contract and will be enforced.  Alternatively, the farmer 
could make the hedge specifically against damage due to drought and enter into 
a derivatives contract based on the weather.  This more closely resembles the 
illegal weather wager, but would be a legitimate and hence enforceable 
derivatives contract.  The same farmer has the alternative of seeking crop 
insurance or drought insurance.  In all of the above situations, one party (the 
farmer) is allocating to the other (the counterparty) the risk of a drought.  The 
rain wager is illegal, but the futures, forward and derivatives contract, as well as 
insurance, are legitimate commercial transactions. 
Id.  See also Hazen, supra note 34, at 375 (equating CDS to “legalized gambling”).  
Unterman likens the derivative industry to a casino “which allows market participants to 
speculate on the probability of default of corporations, securitization transactions, or any 
other entity which could default on obligations.”  Unterman, supra note 13, at 66. 
 93. “Bucket shop” is a derogatory term for a business that offers opportunities to wager 
on prices without delivering the stock or commodity at issue.  Stout, supra note 10, at n.77.  
Bucket shops were off-exchange shops that allowed speculators to “bet on commodities 
prices.”  Keaveny, supra note 88, at 1423.  Typically, the bucket shop offered loans to small 
investors to allow them to buy a derivative interest in stock and bond shares.  No stock was 
actually bought.  Instead, the transaction just went "in the bucket" and was not executed on 
any exchange.  The investor was instead making a "long" or "short" stock bet, betting either 
with or against the bucket shop.  There was the potential for a small speculator to make a 
big gain.  Bucket shops were outlawed in many states in the early 1900’s.  See Dickson v. 
Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188, 197 n.3 (1933) (listing state anti-bucketshop statutes). 
 94. This ensured that “naked” credit default swaps (where the purchaser of the swap did 
not own the underlying bond and hence was not exposed to the risk), were deemed legal and 
not subject to the “insurable interest” requirement of state insurance law.  See Stout, supra 
note 10, at 724-27 (discussing applicability of the insurable interest requirement as a way to 
curb speculation). 
 95. Certain derivatives, such as CDSs, are similar to insurance in that they are risk 
shifting contracts.  Unlike insurance, however, CDSs are not subject to state insurance 
regulation.  Hazen, supra note 15, at 123.  See generally Schwartz, supra note 49 
(discussing the question of whether CDSs should be subject to regulation as insurance). 
 96. Unterman refers to a “shadow economy” created by the transfer of repayment risk 
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margin requirements, and without regulatory supervision.97 
 Although OTC derivatives are not regulated, they are subject to 
private legal rules developed primarily by the International Swaps and 
Dealers Association (“ISDA”).98  The ISDA offers, for example, form 
agreements that dominate the derivatives market.99  Most derivative market 
participants use the ISDA Master Agreement.100  The documents that 
comprise the Master Agreement specify the obligations of each party and 
the relevant events of default.  It also defines the market conventions to be 
followed.101  Once the Master Agreement is executed, the parties reach an 
oral agreement based upon a written term sheet and sign a confirmation 
 
to off-balance sheet special purchase vehicles “which was opaque to regulators and 
investors.”  Unterman, supra note 13, at 60.  See also Silver & Slavkin, supra note 21, at 
332-341 (discussing how deregulation in financial markets led to the “emergence of the 
shadow financial system”). 
 97. Moran, supra note 14, at 42 (“[T]he credit-default swaps market has essentially 
operated in secrecy, with neither public disclosure nor any legal requirement for these 
contracts to be reported to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or any 
other agency.”).  See also Schwartz, supra note 49, at 171-72 (discussing the CDS 
exemption from regulation by either the SEC or the CFTC); Silver & Slavkin, supra note 
21, at 338 (“All of these factors have contributed to the creation of a huge system of 
lending, borrowing, securities underwriting, and insurance underwriting that exists 
completely outside the purview of regulators.”). 
 98. Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY:  the Four Horsemen of Derivative 
Regulation?  (U. of San Diego, Working Paper No. 39, 2002).  Although the OTC 
derivatives markets are largely unregulated, the ISDA represents the interests of participants 
in the privately negotiated derivatives industry.  It is headquartered in New York and is a 
trade association comprised of over 670 leading market participants in the OTC derivative 
industry.  Primary membership is restricted to derivatives dealers.  Id. at 5; Schwartz, supra 
note 49, at 178. 
 99. Id. 
 100.  
Since its inception, ISDA has pioneered efforts to identify and reduce the 
sources of risk in the derivatives and risk management business. Among its 
most notable accomplishments are:  developing the ISDA Master Agreement; 
publishing a wide range of related documentation materials and instruments 
covering a variety of transaction types; producing legal opinions on the 
enforceability of netting and collateral arrangements (available only to ISDA 
members); securing recognition of the risk-reducing effects of netting in 
determining capital requirements; promoting sound risk management practices, 
and advancing the understanding and treatment of derivatives and risk 
management from public policy and regulatory capital perspectives. 
About ISDA, http://www.ISDA.org.  The Master Agreement has been effective in allocating 
risk and increasing legal certainty.  Eppel, supra note 5, at 698; Kim, supra note 3, at 752 
(“ISDA contributed greatly to preventing disputes and reducing transaction costs by 
standardizing the swap agreement.”). 
 101. Kim, supra note 3, at 753; Schwartz, supra note 49, at 178 (“The Master 
Agreements set forth standardized, market-driven terms regulating general obligations of the 
parties, events of default, netting, early termination, transfer, currency provisions, and 
definitions.”). 
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evidencing the terms for their specific transaction.  This confirmation, 
along with the Master Agreement, creates the private law that will govern 
the transaction.102  The agreements outlined by the ISDA documents have 
been judicially enforced103 although they are not typically given absolute 
deference.104  While use of ISDA forms has provided some consistency, 
some concerns have been raised.  Most importantly, the ISDA is controlled 
by a small number of major dealers.  Hence, it is feared that the form 
agreements either are written with dealer-to-dealer contracts in mind, or 
favor dealers in a dealer-to-end-user situation.105   
 Moreover, because a significant number of participants106 in the 
credit derivatives market are banks, the Federal Reserve and the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency establish guidelines and encourage banks 
to identify and manage the risks created by credit derivatives.107  For 
example, the Federal Reserve monitors derivative trading to assure that the 
transactions are properly documented and that best practices are observed.  
This, however, provides general guidelines rather than detailed 
 
 102. Partnoy, supra note 98, at 6. 
 103. See generally Partnoy, supra note 98, at 6-9 (discussing how ISDA documents play 
an important role in judicial decisions).  For example, the court upheld the obligations set 
forth in the ISDA documents and found federal securities laws inapplicable based on 
representations set forth in those documents.  Caiola v. Citibank, 137 F. Supp. 2d 362, 364 
(S.D.N.Y 2001). 
 104. See Partnoy, supra note 98, at 9 (discussing the “extensive body of law that refuses 
to treat contracts of adhesion or standard form contracts like other negotiated contracts”).  
As with other contracts of adhesion, the central question is one of relative bargaining power 
of the parties.  One way to avoid judicial disruption of the ISDA agreements would be to 
choose arbitration.  Oddly enough, ISDA documents do not typically provide for arbitration.  
Id. at 11 (“The 1992 ISDA Master Agreement does not contain an arbitration clause.  
Instead, Section 11(b) of that agreement provides that each party submits irrevocably to the 
jurisdiction of the appropriate courts.”). 
 105. Partnoy, supra note 98, at 10. 
 106. Although the transactions are not regulated, arguably the participants in the OTC 
derivatives market are regulated.  See Lynch, supra note 10, at 1380 (“Although the OTC 
credit derivatives products themselves are not regulated, certain market participants are.” 
(quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Credit Derivatives:  Confirmation Backlogs 
Increased Dealers’ Operational Risk, but Were Successfully Addressed After Joint 
Regulatory Action, 10-11 (June 2007))).  See infra note 135 (distinguishing between entity 
and transaction regulation in the financial market). 
 107. Tijoe, supra note 10, at 397.  Rather than establishing mandatory rules, the Federal 
Reserve and the OCC have taken an “oversight approach.”  For example, the OCC 
established guidelines on the risks inherent in credit derivatives and urged institutions to 
analyze those risks and to adopt sound risk management policies and procedures.  The focus 
here is typically upon risk management procedures at the relevant institutions.  Banking 
regulators indirectly regulate the use of derivatives by examinations, reporting requirements, 
and capital requirements.  Eppel, supra note 5, at 680-89.  Moreover, banks are required to 
reveal the total notional value of their OTC derivative contracts and their total aggregated 
credit exposure from such transactions.  Kojima, supra note 1, at 283. 
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regulation.108  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Payment 
and Settlement Systems (“Basel Committee”)109 also recognizes the risks 
presented by credit derivatives and has urged banking supervisors to take 
into account the related credit exposure.110  Similarly, securities firms are 
subject to oversight by the SEC which requires the maintenance of records 
and periodic disclosure filings.111 
B. How the Failure to Adequately Regulate Contributed to the Current 
Crisis 
 In 2000, when Congress chose not to regulate derivatives, the 
decision was based on the belief that the OTC derivatives market was too 
small to create any systemic risk.  Moreover, people believed that investors 
would act to minimize their own risk, which would protect the broader 
financial system.112  It is clear, as outlined above, that these beliefs were 
flawed.  The lack of regulation allowed credit-default swaps and CDOs to 
exist without required reserves.  In addition, there were no assurances that 
the sellers could meet their contractual obligations.  Purchasers of credit 
derivatives were able to circumvent margin requirements on their 
purchases.113  Moreover, government regulators lacked the power to assess 
systemic risk and could not judge whether the valuations were accurate.114  
 
 108. Schwartz, supra note 49, at 172-73 (“Federal Banking Regulators and their work do 
not stand to fundamentally regulate the substance of CDS trading going into the future.”). 
 109. The Basel Committee is an international organization committed to providing 
“common standards for prudent management of credit risk by banks.”  Andre Scheerer, 
Credit Derivatives:  An Overview of Regulatory Initiatives in the US and Europe, 5 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 149, 164-65 (2000). 
 110. Tijoe, supra note 10, at 398. 
 111. Kojima, supra note 1, at 284-86.  Kojima describes, however, how “[i]n practice . . . 
actual oversight of securities firms’ OTC derivatives activities is relatively slight.”  Id. at 
285.  He explains that this is because many of the provisions that mandate disclosure and 
protect against fraud are triggered by the purchase and sale of “securities” and, thus, do not 
apply to OTC derivatives. 
 112. Moran, supra note 14, at 42 (“In 2000, Congress specifically chose not to regulate 
credit-default swaps, as the consensus was that the market was still very small and no 
systemic risk would exist since investors’ inclinations to minimize their risks would protect 
the broader financial system.”).  Alan Greenspan argued against regulation in 2005, while he 
was Chairman of the Federal Reserve.  He asserted that “prudential regulation is supplied by 
the market through counterparty evaluation and monitoring rather than by authorities.  See 
Greenspan, 2005, supra note 1 (“[P]rivate regulation has generally proved far better at 
constraining excessive risk-taking than has government regulation.”). 
 113. Evan N. Turgeon, Boom and Bust for Whom?:  The Economic Philosophy Behind 
the 2008 Financial Crisis, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 139, 161 (2009) (“Trading financial 
derivatives over the counter allows investors to circumvent margin requirements on stock 
purchases.”). 
 114. See White Paper, supra note 11, at 47 (“Lacking authority to regulate the OTC 
derivatives market, regulators were unable to identify or mitigate the enormous systemic 
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We know now that buyers and sellers of credit-default swaps and CDOs 
relied too heavily on financial markets.  They failed to predict the housing 
crisis and placed too much trust in the credit ratings of the firms selling the 
swaps.  These ratings significantly overvalued those firms and 
underestimated the risks involved.115 
III.  PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 Following a crisis, it is common for officials to seek regulatory 
reform.116  On June 17, 2009, the Obama Administration offered a proposal 
(the “Obama Proposal”), which was meant to address weaknesses in 
regulatory oversight that arguably contributed to the GFC.117  The Obama 
Proposal addresses perceived regulatory weaknesses across a number of 
areas within the Unites States financial markets including regulation of 
OTC derivatives.  Taken in its entirety, the Obama Proposal is intended to 
meet five key objectives:  1) to promote robust supervision and regulation 
of financial firms, 2) to establish comprehensive supervision and regulation 
of financial markets, 3) to protect consumers and investors from financial 
abuse, 4) to improve tools for managing financial crises, and 5) to raise 
international regulatory standards and improve international cooperation.118 
Within the Obama Proposal, there are numerous proposals for 
 
threat that had developed.”); Moran, supra note 14, at 42 (noting that “government 
regulators lacked any means to assess the amount of risk in the system”). 
 115. While a more detailed discussion of the role that credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”) 
played in allowing the GFC to develop is beyond the scope of this paper, some scholars 
argue that the optimistic ratings assigned to CDOs by CRAs were the real culprit in creating 
the GFC.  Although many of the underlying assets were subprime mortgages, the ratings 
agencies’ models suggested minimal chances of loss.  Thus, the majority of CDOs were 
assigned investment grade ratings of AAA.  Neither the bank risk managers nor the 
regulators questioned the high number of optimistic ratings for CDOs.  Hence, Jones, supra 
note 13, at 8, argues that the OTC derivatives themselves were not the problem.  Rather the 
real issue stemmed from the fact that regulators failed to question the banks’ large 
investments in CDOs. 
It is clear that the CRAs failed to effectively assess the risks associated with this system.  In 
fact, “[t]wo themes of the credit crisis which have emerged clearly are that CRAs were 
overwhelming failures when it came to evaluating SF risks and that the market relied far to 
[sic] much on these erroneous ratings.”  Unterman, supra note 13, at 66.  See also id. at 70 
(“What is now common knowledge is that the ratings assigned to CDOs failed to take into 
account all the risks involved.  The methodologies relied on by the CRAs to rate CDOs 
resulted in these tranches being valued more than the cost of the underlying assets.”). 
 116. See generally Born, supra note 10 (noting that three international derivatives crises 
over the last two decades resulted in strong efforts to create international regulations to 
prevent similar future crises); Eppel, supra note 5, at 677-78 (discussing the risks of 
derivatives trading and the efforts taken by national and international regulators to minimize 
those risks). 
 117. White Paper, supra note 11, at 43. 
 118. Id. at 3-4. 
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regulatory reforms related specifically to OTC derivatives.  The objectives 
of the regulatory reforms targeted toward OTC derivatives are fourfold:  1) 
to reduce the systemic risk that OTC derivatives may pose to the financial 
system, 2) to increase the efficiency and transparency of the OTC 
derivatives markets, 3) to prevent manipulation, fraud, and other abuses, 
and 4) to prevent OTC derivatives from being sold to unsophisticated 
investors.119 
A. Standardization and Transparency 
It is important to note that the Obama Proposal does not contain 
initiatives to limit or eliminate OTC derivatives.  OTC derivatives, 
themselves, are only affected by the Proposal’s call for standardization.  
The Obama Proposal accomplishes this by encouraging both the SEC and 
national authorities to act to increase standardization and transparency of 
credit derivatives.120  No specifics are set forth in the Proposal. 
Aside from calling for the standardization of OTC derivative 
instruments, the proposed regulatory reforms encompass two broad areas.  
The first reform involves market participants, while the second focuses on 
the harmonization of regulatory agencies.  These specific proposals are 
outlined in the following sections. 
B. Regulation of OTC derivative market participants 
The Obama Proposal recommends regulation directed toward 
purchasers and originators of derivatives, banks and bank holding 
companies that engage in derivative transactions, and the process by which 
derivatives are cleared.  Taken together, these proposals are designed to 
reduce systemic risk. 
First, the Obama Proposal calls upon federal banking regulators to 
promulgate regulations that require the originator of a securitized credit 
exposure to retain an economic interest in a material portion of the risk of 
that credit exposure.121 
Second, because banks and bank holding companies are frequent 
counterparties in OTC derivatives transactions, there is concern about the 
increased risk undertaken by banks engaged in OTC derivatives deals.  As 
a step toward increasing the safety of the banking system, the Obama 
Proposal advocates imposing conservative capital requirements on banks 
and bank holding companies participating in the OTC derivatives market.122  
 
 119. Id. at 46-47. 
 120. Id. at 45. 
 121. Id. at 44. 
 122. Id. at 48. 
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Even higher capital requirements are associated with OTC derivatives that 
are not centrally cleared.123 
Third, the Obama Proposal calls for several amendments to the 
Commodities Exchange Act (“CEA”).  Most importantly, it proposes the 
establishment of central counterparties (“CCP”) to clear standardized OTC 
derivative instruments.124  This aspect of the proposed reform is intended to 
increase market efficiency and price transparency among market 
participants and to help curtail counterparty losses.  Moreover, the Obama 
Proposal calls for the CCPs to be regulated, although no specific regulator 
is identified for the task.125  In addition, the CCPs are required to establish 
margin requirements to be applied to derivatives purchases.126 
Last, under the Obama Proposal, only sophisticated purchasers are 
permitted to purchase OTC derivatives.127  This limits the involvement of 
unsophisticated investors, who cannot understand the risks associated with 
derivatives transactions, and those who cannot afford the potential losses. 
C. Harmonization of regulatory agencies 
Under the Obama Proposal, the SEC and the CFTC would continue to 
share regulatory responsibility for the derivatives market, including 
regulation of OTC derivatives.128  The proposal acknowledges the 
discrepancies that exist between the SEC’s rules-based approach and the 
principles-based approach of the CFTC with respect to policing the OTC 
derivatives market.129  This has resulted in vastly differing regulatory 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. White Paper, supra note 11, at 47.  Note that under the current system, centralized 
counterparties exist for the clearing of OTC derivative instruments.  However, there is no 
requirement that OTC derivative instruments be cleared through a CCP.  Hence, currently, 
parties to an OTC derivative instrument can choose not to conduct their transactions through 
a CCP. 
 125. This has the potential to create turf wars.  See supra note 87 and accompanying text 
(discussing the turf wars between the SEC and the CFTC).  See also infra note 142 and 
accompanying text (proposing the combination of the two agencies to eliminate such intra-
agency infighting). 
 126. See supra note 34 (explaining that exchange-traded derivatives are already subject 
to such margin requirements). 
 127. White Paper, supra note 11, at 47. 
 128. Id. at 49. 
 129. Theoretically, there are several competing paradigms of securities regulation.  
Commentators have discussed “principles-based” regulation, “rules-based” regulation, and 
“institution-based” financial regulation.  The distinction between the principles-based 
approach and the rules-based approach is best understood as a continuum.  At one end of the 
spectrum is the principles-based approach, where the regulatory agency articulates 
principles and allows the firm to determine how best to meet the outcome required by the 
principle.  At the other end of the spectrum, under the rules-based approach, the regulator 
sets forth specific rules dictating how the outcome sought should be achieved.  The 
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schemes based on which agency has authority.130  To reduce the 
inconsistencies between the SEC and CFTC, the proposal requires that both 
agencies review the “rules” and “principles” and reconcile their differences 
to achieve consistent regulation of the OTC derivatives market.  Under the 
Obama Proposal, the CFTC would retain enforcement responsibility over 
the commodity pool operators (i.e., hedge funds), while the SEC would 
take on additional responsibility with regard to commodity pool 
operators.131  Both agencies would impose recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements, including an audit trail, for all OTC derivatives. 
Harmonization between the SEC and the CFTC is intended to 
facilitate competition among markets and exchanges.132  Currently, 
financial instruments with similar characteristics can trade on different 
exchanges and therefore are subject to different regulatory requirements.  
By harmonizing the SEC and the CFTC, the proposal envisions that a 
larger variety of instruments would be traded on a wider range of 
exchanges and would be subject to identical regulatory requirements.  This 
should increase competition among exchanges and arguably benefit market 
participants with lower transactions costs and increased market efficiency. 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE OBAMA PROPOSAL 
 Regulation of financial markets is important to achieve several 
public policy objectives.  For example, regulation is important to the extent 
 
principles-based approach is the common approach adopted internationally.  Yesenia 
Cervantes, “Fin-Rah!” . . . A Welcome Change:  Why the Merger was Necessary to 
Preserve U.S. Market Integrity, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 829, 858 (2008).  This 
approach sets standards based on firms’ behaviors and expectations, rather than by adopting 
strict rules.  See generally Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-
Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L. J. 1, 60 (2008) (arguing that the principles-
based approach is a “rational, systematic alternative” to the less flexible rules-based 
approach); James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 
625 (2007) (comparing the principles-based approach to the rules-based approach and 
proposing guidelines to aid in choosing between the two regimes).  Other scholars reject 
both of these approaches.  See John H. Walsh, Institution-Based Financial Regulation:  A 
Third Paradigm, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381, 382 (2008) (arguing for “institution-based” 
regulation, under which the government or SRO requires entities to create internal 
institutions). 
 130. Under the current regulatory regime, the SEC has regulatory purview over the 
options traded on a given security, while the futures contracts on the same underlying 
security are jointly regulated by the CFTC and the SEC.  See generally Duffie & Hu, supra 
note 8, at 24-31 (discussing the differences between CFTC and SEC regulations and 
comparing the rules-based approach to the principles-based approach employed in the 
U.K.). 
 131. White Paper, supra note 11, at 50-51. 
 132. Id. at 49-50. 
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that it promotes economic efficiency.133  Moreover, regulation minimizes 
systemic risk.134  However, scholars recognize the inherent difficulties in 
promulgating rules to regulate financial derivatives.135  The public policy 
goals of derivatives regulation are further hampered by the conflicting 
results of derivative use.  To the extent that derivatives provide an effective 
way to distribute and, thus, minimize risk, they should be promoted.136  By 
contrast, to the extent that they increase risk and spread risk, their use 
should be discouraged.  Effective regulation must confront the risks 
inherent in derivatives use, including risks from counterparty losses 
(default risk), market liquidity risk and systemic risk, while retaining the 
benefits of derivatives’ use.137  Moreover, any regulation of the derivative 
markets must recognize the complexity of derivatives and the high rate of 
their innovation.  In other words, any regulation must take into account the 
fact that the derivative instrument that will be the subject of regulation 
 
 133. Schwartz, supra note 49, at 205 (“[T]he primary, if not sole, justification for 
regulating financial risk is maximizing economic efficiency”); Stout, supra note 10, at 709 
(arguing for “legal rules that protect beneficial forms of trading while discouraging 
inefficient transactions”). 
 134. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 49, at 205-06 (discussing the tragedy of the 
commons and the notion that without regulation, no single firm has the incentive to limit its 
risk sufficiently to prevent systemic failure). 
 135. Derivatives regulation can be entity based, transaction based, or self-regulatory.  
Entity based regulation imposes disclosure requirements on participants in derivative 
markets.  For example, an entity based regulation might require a participant to disclose its 
exposure from credit derivatives.  Wynkoop, supra note 2, at 3114.  By contrast, transaction 
based regulation requires disclosures regarding the specific credit derivative contracts into 
which parties enter.  Such disclosure could include the price of the credit derivative, or the 
reference asset.  Id. at 3118.  Finally, the self-regulatory model leaves participants in the 
credit derivatives market to impose non-governmental regulation upon themselves.  Id. at 
3121.  Compare Kojima, supra note 1 (discussing the difference between what he terms 
institution-based and product-based regulation and concluding  product-based regulation is 
the most appropriate), and Wynkoop, supra note 2, at 3113-25 (discussing the advantages 
and disadvantages of each model and concluding that the transaction based regulation is the 
most effective), with Gibson, supra note 15, at 414-16 (discussing each model and 
concluding that the entity based model is the most appropriate for derivatives market 
regulation).  Note that the Obama Proposal incorporates aspects of both transaction based 
and entity based regulation. 
 136. Recall that derivatives are effective at distributing and minimizing risks when used 
correctly.  Moreover, the use of derivatives achieves other objectives, such as increased 
liquidity.  See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (discussing some of the advantages of 
derivatives, including reallocating market and credit risks).  Regulation of derivatives must 
strive to minimize the risks of derivatives without interfering with their benefits.  
Regulations that seek to prescribe risk limits, for example, should be avoided because such 
action would reduce liquidity in the market and increase volatility in asset prices.  Eppel, 
supra note 5, at 693. 
 137. Gibson, supra note 15, at 411 (“The major policy concerns specific to the OTC 
derivatives market are the promotion of financial innovation and fair competition and the 
prevention of counterparty losses.”). 
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tomorrow has not been devised today.138 
In addition, it has been suggested that unless carefully crafted, such 
legal rules might actually create “incentives for inefficient regulatory 
arbitrage, regulatory competition, and regulatory licenses.”139  This may be 
the case for a number of reasons.  First, regulations impose regulatory 
costs.140  If those costs are imposed only on a subset of transactions, where 
there is an unregulated, economically equivalent choice, parties will switch 
from the regulated to the unregulated choice.141  Second, regulatory 
competition frequently results in suboptimal regulation, typically resulting 
in a “race-to-the-bottom” regulatory scheme.142  Finally, when regulatory 
authority is delegated to private parties, incentives are created that 
potentially further distort financial markets. 
 This section will attempt to analyze the Obama Proposal through the 
lens discussed above.  We will consider the specific guidelines outlined in 
the proposal and look more broadly at the objectives of derivatives market 
regulation.  We offer a number of specific suggestions within the following 
sections. 
 
 138. See, e.g., Eppel, supra note 5, at 680 (“Definitions are all-important in derivatives 
regulation, as the high rate of innovation means that new financial products are often not 
clearly subject to either direct or indirect regulations, setting up turf wars between rival 
regulators or allowing a new product to be bought and sold without any effective 
regulation.”); Omarova, supra note 19, at 162-63 (“[T]he focus on regulating specific 
financial products or activities, such as credit default swaps or mortgage-backed securities, 
which were directly implicated in triggering or magnifying the effects of the current crisis, 
is fundamentally misplaced.  The next systemic shock is most likely to originate in a 
different pocket of the financial market.  As the markets for some financial products are 
evaporating . . . the brightest and the most ambitious of the Wall Street wizards looking for 
the ‘next big thing’ are creating new, even more complicated and opaque, financial 
instruments with high potential to generate profit—and accordingly, risk.”). 
 139. Partnoy, supra note 98, at 15. 
 140. This includes direct and indirect regulatory costs, which are imposed on participants 
in the system as well as governmental regulatory costs.  Schwarcz, supra note 25, at 208. 
 141. Partnoy, supra note 98, at 15. 
 142. Id. at 16.  The current proposals suffer from this potential problem as the SEC and 
CFTC vie for regulatory authority.  The CFTC and the SEC have engaged in turf wars in the 
past which have arguably allowed regulation of credit derivatives to slip between the 
regulatory cracks.  See Gibson, supra note 15, at 388 (“The jurisdictional dispute between 
the SEC and CFTC regarding derivative transactions has existed since the inception of the 
CFTC.”); Kramer, supra note 26, at 434-37 (discussing the competition between the SEC 
and CFTC); Partnoy, supra note 23, at 432 (“[C]ompetition has led to a nasty and inefficient 
‘turf battle’ and costly uncertainty.”); see also Tijoe, supra note 10, at 395 (“Currently, turf 
wars between the SEC and the CFTC have created a loophole where credit derivatives are 
not fully managed by either agency in the United States.”).  See infra notes 185-90 and 
accompanying text (advocating for a single regulatory body with control over derivative 
regulation to avoid confusion and turf battles). 
D'SOUZAFINALIZED_FIVE 3/31/2010  2:04:18 AM 
504 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
A. Standardization and Transparency 
1.  Standardization of OTC Derivatives 
Under the Obama Proposal, OTC derivatives would become 
standardized.  This is not the first time that we have heard cries for 
standardization.143  There are benefits to standardization, and the ISDA 
forms have provided such benefits.144  In reality, however, most OTC 
derivatives are highly customized or, at best, only semi-standardized.  In 
fact, the appeal of OTC derivatives is the ability to customize the product 
to meet the risk management needs of both parties involved in the 
transaction.  OTC derivatives are often created precisely because there is 
no standardized derivative product available for the risk management needs 
of the parties involved.  Hence, because of the customization involved, it 
may be very difficult to impose standardization requirements on OTC 
derivatives.  Moreover, any such standardized language and terms will be 
difficult to fashion because of the complexity and variety of derivatives.145 
In addition, the standardization requirement is, in many ways, a move 
toward making OTC derivatives exchange-traded.146  This is problematic 
for a number of reasons.  First, it is highly unlikely that all OTC derivatives 
could become exchange-traded.  Hence, the standardization requirement 
could effectively eliminate the ability to use some types of OTC derivatives 
and also curtail innovations leading to the development of new OTC 
derivative products.  Second, innovation could well work to avoid any such 
regulation entirely.  In other words, unless carefully crafted, any 
standardization guidelines could be circumvented by the creation of new 
 
 143. See, e.g., ALASTAIR HUDSON, THE LAW ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 352-58 (2d ed. 
1998) (proposing to standardize documentation for derivatives products). 
 144. See Feder, supra note 9, at 736 (“Eventually, standardization of terms and 
documents came to be understood as a way to allow parties to conduct derivatives 
transactions efficiently because it clarifies basics with relatively minimal time and 
resources.”).  ISDA forms “dominate the OTC derivatives markets . . . .”  Id. at 738. 
 145. See id. at 741 (“There are . . . limits to standardization . . . . [M]arket participants 
never quite agree among themselves what terms should be standard . . . .”). 
 146. Such standardization will allow for trading through the proposed central clearing 
parties.  See supra note 124 (explaining that currently, parties to an OTC derivative 
instrument can choose whether to conduct their transactions through a CCP).  Arguably, 
there are benefits to making OTC derivatives exchange-traded.  For example, it would allow 
for better price transparency, and would make it easier for regulators to track whether or not 
participants are fulfilling their obligations.  Also, it is worth noting that the Federation of 
European Securities Exchanges has argued that if OTC derivatives had been exchange-
traded, the magnitude of the problems presumably caused by them would have been 
dramatically less, or even nonexistent.  See Jones, supra note 13, at 1 (noting the 
Federation’s suggestion that if these instruments had been traded on a public exchange, the 
problems associated with them may not have arisen). 
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derivatives products.147 
2. Transparency and Mandated Disclosures 
Federal securities law regulation is based on the premise of disclosure 
as the primary regulatory mechanism.148  The lack of transparency in 
today’s derivatives markets has been cited as a contributing factor to the 
GFC.  It is argued that the lack of transparency, along with the complexity 
of the instruments used, led to a level of opaqueness that “created huge 
information asymmetries and failures”149 and prevented the market from 
being able to effectively price and monitor derivatives.150  Therefore, it has 
been argued that increased transparency is essential, specifically with 
respect to credit derivatives.151 
The Obama Proposal includes calls for increased transparency within 
the OTC derivatives market.152  We support increased disclosures.  One of 
the problems with the Obama Proposal with respect to increased 
transparency, however, is that it is unclear as to which disclosures should 
be mandated.  While it is understandable that the specifics of disclosures 
should be left within Congressional purview, the specifics do matter.  Some 
 
 147. Cf. Feder, supra note 9, at 741 (“[S]tandardization must balance a goal of universal 
applicability with the need to address a parade of business practice and legal issues.”). 
 148. See Hazen, supra note 34, at 383 (“Disclosure rather than a merit approach remains 
the regulatory philosophy of the federal securities laws today.”).  The theory is that if risks 
are made “transparent to all”, investors would properly “price-in” all risks.  Schwarcz, supra 
note 25, at 218. 
 149. Unterman, supra note 13, at 87.  See also Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1036 
(discussing the fact that the market for credit default swaps is “opaque,” meaning that the 
details of particular swaps are undisclosed, and that the ISDA has resisted calls for 
disclosure of credit default swap documentation). 
 150. See Wynkoop, supra note 2, at 3111 (“Given this lack of relevant information in the 
credit market, traders cannot properly perform their function to create an efficient market.”).  
See also Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 21, at 338 (“Neither regulators nor the public have 
access to sufficient information to assess the risk within these assets or counterparty 
exposure arising from participating in these opaque markets.”). 
 151. At least one commentator has noted the disparity between the increased disclosure 
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the massive deregulation of the 
CFMA.  See Hazen, supra note 34, at 382 (discussing the divergence of recent regulatory 
developments).  At least one commentator believes that whether or not such increased 
transparency is statutorily mandated or voluntary is irrelevant.  See generally Partnoy & 
Skeel, supra note 8, at 1046-47 (“We believe disclosure with respect to both credit default 
swaps and CDOs should improve, although we are agnostic as to whether improved 
disclosure requires government intervention.”).  Similar disclosure issues have been 
discussed relating to hedge funds.  See, e.g., Jennifer Ralph Oppold, The Changing 
Landscape of Hedge Fund Regulation:  Current Concerns and a Principle-Based Approach, 
10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 833 (2008) (examining disclosure requirements in the hedge 
fund industry). 
 152. White Paper, supra note 11, at 45. 
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have argued that mandating disclosure in the derivatives market will be 
ineffective because “[n]obody has yet figured out what it makes sense to 
disclose!”153  Others have recognized dangers in reforms that attempt to 
increase transparency without providing adequate incentives to internalize 
risk,154 and have argued that disclosure requirements that are too stringent 
might prove counterproductive and work to reduce market liquidity.155 
One of the primary purposes of any mandated disclosures should be to 
allow the transparency needed for proper valuation and risk assessment.  
We believe that the following disclosures should be required. 
First, market participants should be required to register credit 
derivative transactions and publish their documentation.156  This would 
allow regulators to better track the risk exposures of individual parties 
involved in OTC derivative transactions and to be able to address potential 
problems before they become massive and spread throughout the financial 
system. 
 Second, “companies that are already reporting companies should be 
required to include . . . [a discussion about] the effect of credit derivatives 
transactions on their risk exposure” in disclosure documents.157  In other 
words, counterparties to derivative contracts should be required to report 
the potential risks as part of standard SEC reporting.  One commentator has 
argued in favor of a disclosure scheme modeled on the Trade Reporting 
and Compliance Engine (“TRACE”) system for corporate bonds.158  
Disclosing risk exposure would be a more palatable alternative than 
imposing risk limits on financial institutions.159 
Third, end-users need to know the pricing mechanism and inputs 
employed for valuation of the derivative.160  Without knowing the pricing 
 
 153. Miller, supra note 15.  “A derivative is not like a piece of real estate you put on 
your books and appraise from time to time.  The dealer’s book and risk exposure changes 
from minute to minute.”  Id. 
 154. See, e.g., Turgeon, supra note 113, at 170 (noting that “such measures actually tend 
to exacerbate future financial crises” and that disclosures mandated under such schemes 
actually “worsened these problems”). 
 155. See Schwarcz, supra note 25, at 219 (discussing limits on the efficacy of 
disclosure). 
 156. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1047 (“[M]arket participants should be 
required to register credit derivatives transactions by publishing the documentation for their 
transactions through a service such as the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
Edgar service.”). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Wynkoop, supra note 2, at 3112 (noting that the TRACE system works to 
“increase transparency in the corporate bond market by providing free, real-time prices on 
over-the-counter corporate bonds.”). 
 159. See Schwarcz, supra note 25, at 222-23 (arguing against imposition of financial 
exposure limits as a way to mitigate systemic risk). 
 160. See Kojima, supra note 1, at 324 (discussing the types of information sought by 
end-users of OTC derivatives). 
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mechanisms adopted and the inputs employed, the purchaser has no way to 
adequately value or assess the risks involved in the derivative. 
B. Regulation of Derivatives Market Participants 
 The Obama Proposal offers a number of recommendations targeted 
at market participants as a way to reduce systemic risk.  First, the proposal 
would require that the originator of the derivative retain an economic 
interest in the derivative.  Second, it would impose conservative capital 
requirements on banks.  Third, it would create a central clearing party 
(“CCP”).  Last, it would limit purchases to sophisticated investors. 
1.  Retention of Credit Risk 
 The Obama Proposal requires that the originator of a securitized 
credit exposure retain an economic interest in the credit exposure.161  While 
forcing originators to retain a portion of the securitized assets reduces some 
of the originators’ available liquidity and means that the overall available 
capital within the financial system is reduced, we support this proposal.  
Such a requirement would prevent the originator from shifting all of the 
credit risk to other investors, and would provide an incentive for the 
originator to carefully and correctly assess the risk associated with assets 
that are to be securitized.  To the extent that the GFC was precipitated by 
unsupervised and unwise lending practices, this proposal is a good idea.  It 
would encourage meaningful monitoring of borrower behavior. 162 
2. Capital Requirements for Banks 
The Obama Proposal advocates imposing conservative capital 
requirements on banks and bank holding companies participating in the 
OTC derivatives market.  Higher capital requirements would be associated 
with OTC derivatives that are not centrally cleared.163  Consumers’ and 
investors’ concerns about the solvency of banks played a critical role in 
 
 161. White Paper, supra note 11, at 44. 
 162. For example, mortgage banks would have an incentive to more accurately assess the 
creditworthiness of borrowers, since they stand to lose if borrowers associated with 
mortgages in the securitized pool default.  Historically, mortgage banks have been able to 
transfer 100% of the credit risk to the securitized pool.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting 
Financial Markets:  Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 
384 (2008).  In addition, this proposal would minimize the perverse disincentives where the 
counterparties benefit upon default (the “Darth Vader monitor”).  See Partnoy & Skeel, 
supra note 8, at 1035 (referring to a lender that benefits more if there is a default than if 
default is averted as a “Darth Vader monitor”). 
 163. White Paper, supra note 11, at 48. 
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hastening the financial meltdown that occurred in the fall of 2008 as part of 
the GFC.  Most of the concerns arose as a result of uncertainty surrounding 
banks’ exposure to subprime mortgages and OTC derivatives activities.  An 
attempt to increase the capital requirements for banks participating in risky 
OTC derivatives transactions would lead to increased confidence in the 
U.S. banking system, thereby reducing investor and consumer confidence 
concerns. 
However, while the imposition of capital requirements may be a good 
idea, the Obama Proposal fails to specify precise numerical guidelines for 
the increased capital requirements.  The numerical guidelines chosen must 
balance the advantages of reducing system risk against the possibility of 
decreasing liquidity.  There is a trade-off for banks, as an increase in capital 
reserves means a lower return on equity (“ROE”).164  This situation might 
result in difficulty attracting needed capital if a bank’s ROE is not in the 
range that would be considered within the industry as “high performing.”165  
Therefore, the specific numerical guidelines must be carefully chosen to 
balance these interests. 
Moreover, derivative transactions are currently reported by banks as 
off-balance sheet items and are subject to risk-based capital requirements 
by bank regulators.166  Any attempt to increase the capital requirements for 
banks engaged in OTC derivative transactions must be contingent upon the 
ability to assess the value of the derivatives’ positions and evaluate the 
riskiness of these positions.  The proposed increases in capital requirements 
for banks hinge upon improved price transparency within this market.167 
In addition to increased capital requirements, banks and bank holding 
companies should be subject to increased deposit insurance premiums 
when they are engaged in risky OTC derivatives activities.  This would be 
an additional measure that would further promote the safety and soundness 
of the banking system, and would increase the reserves available to the 
FDIC to handle insolvent banks. 
 
 
 164. TIMOTHY W. KOCH AND S. SCOTT MACDONALD, BANK MANAGEMENT 231 (7th ed. 
2010). 
 165. For example, ROE is a profitability measure that represents the return received by 
shareholders (or stockholders).  For a bank, capital is primarily comprised of stock (or 
equity).  Hence, if ROE is low, it will be difficult to attract new capital in the form of equity.  
For further discussion, see KOCH AND MACDONALD, supra note 164, at 231. 
 166. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-253, RISK-BASED CAPITAL:  BANK 
REGULATORS NEED TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND OVERCOME IMPEDIMENTS TO 
FINALIZING THE PROPOSED BASEL II FRAMEWORK 17 (2007). 
 167. See supra notes 148-160 and accompanying text (discussing transparency in the 
OTC derivatives market). 
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3. Unsophisticated Investors Banned from OTC Derivatives 
The Obama Proposal seeks to prevent the sale of OTC derivatives to 
unsophisticated investors.168  Typically, unsophisticated investors are those 
investors with the ability to take a large financial position in a particular 
financial instrument.  Additionally, investors are classified as either 
wholesale or retail investors, with wholesale being synonymous with 
sophisticated.  Historically, the OTC derivatives market has been 
comprised of wholesale investors, typically institutional investors in need 
of OTC derivative products for risk management purposes.  The notional 
value of OTC derivatives products generally precludes most retail investors 
(e.g., unsophisticated investors) from participating in the OTC derivatives 
market.  In addition, most retail investors would not be involved directly in 
OTC derivatives positions due to the high transaction costs associated with 
OTC derivatives.  As such, mutual funds, incorporating the use of OTC 
derivatives into their portfolio management strategies, are the primary ways 
that retail investors encounter OTC derivatives.169  Therefore, this provision 
of the Proposal would apply to few derivatives purchasers.  However, if 
OTC derivatives become more standardized and moved toward electronic 
trading platforms, we can envision smaller notional value OTC derivative 
products being made available to retail investors. 
Because of the uncertainty as to how the OTC derivatives market may 
evolve following regulation, the prevention of unsophisticated investors 
from participating in the market is prudent.  In the wake of the GFC, even 
sophisticated investors found OTC derivatives very complex and difficult 
to understand.  Moreover, until the current problems within the OTC 
derivatives market are adequately addressed by regulatory reform, we 
believe it is best not to expand the availability of OTC derivative products 
to retail investors and perhaps exacerbate the economic woes of 
individuals. 
4. Clearing on Regulated CCPs 
The Obama Proposal urges national authorities to promote the clearing 
of OTC derivative transactions by regulated CCPs.170  The CCP would 
serve as an intermediary to determine the value of the position of each 
party involved at any given point in time.  Moreover, the CCP would 
ensure that each party to the transaction fulfills its obligation.  Requiring 
that derivatives clear through a regulated CCP would work toward 
 
 168. White Paper, supra note 11, at 47. 
 169. PAUL STILLABOWER, THE ECONOMICS OF OTC DERIVATIVES PROCESSING, THE TRADE 
NEWS, Feb. 17, 2007, http://www.thetradenews.com/expert-opinion/530. 
 170. White Paper, supra note 11, at 47. 
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improving price transparency within this market and would make it easier 
to gauge the risk exposure of each party involved in an OTC derivatives 
transaction.  This requirement would also allow parties to unwind positions 
and recognize losses before they become extremely large.171 
Because the Obama Proposal does not state which agency would 
regulate the CCPs, we are concerned that a turf war could arise between the 
CFTC and the Federal Reserve as to which agency should regulate the 
CCPs.  The regulatory turf war may arise because the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (regulated by the CFTC) and ICE Trust (regulated by the New 
York Federal Reserve) are already serving as clearing houses for OTC 
derivatives transactions, but are regulated by different entities.  We think 
the CFTC172 should assume responsibility for the regulation of the CCPs 
because this agency has specialized knowledge of derivatives exchanges 
and markets.  The CFTC is likely in the best regulatory position to 
determine the type of regulation that should be imposed on the CCPs. 
The Obama Proposal recognizes that international cooperation is 
needed to strengthen the regulatory system of global financial markets and 
urges national authorities to promote the clearing of OTC derivatives 
transactions through regulated CCPs.173  The OTC derivatives market is 
truly a global market.  A full 43% of worldwide OTC derivatives 
transactions occur in London, with only 24% of the transactions occurring 
in the United States (primarily New York).174  Moreover, London is 
responsible for 47% of all cross-border OTC derivative transactions.  As 
such, any regulation of the OTC derivatives market needs to be a concerted 
effort among nations in which OTC derivatives are of significant 
importance to their financial markets.175  Otherwise, if one country imposes 
 
 171. Parties can unwind their positions by liquidating or taking the opposite position.  
For example, if a party has purchased a contract, they can sell the contract to eliminate their 
position.  Conversely, if a party has sold a contract, they can purchase a contract to 
eliminate their position.  Jones, supra note 13, at 9. 
 172. Specifically, we are referring to the CFTC arm of the SEC as proposed below.  See 
infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text (recommending merging the SEC and CFTC into 
a single regulatory body). 
 173. See White Paper, supra note 11, at 5-8 (describing ways to improve international 
regulatory standards). 
 174. France, Germany and Japan represent a combined 15% of the remaining worldwide 
OTC derivatives transactions.  Jones, supra note 13, at 6.  See also Duffie & Hu, supra note 
8, at 10 (discussing the U.S. market share of derivatives worldwide and stating:  “In terms of 
OTC derivatives, from 1998 to 2007 the U.S. has maintained its worldwide market share of 
trading in traditional OTC derivatives . . . . The U.S. share of the total worldwide credit 
derivatives market has been roughly constant in the period 2002 to 2006, while the U.K. 
share has declined significantly.”) 
 175. The European Union Commission is already discussing regulation of OTC 
derivatives.  Thus far, there is a sense that OTC derivatives will be required to be cleared 
through a regulated CCP that is based in the Eurozone, which does not include the United 
Kingdom.  Given that London represents the largest volume of OTC derivative transactions 
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stringent regulations on OTC derivatives, there will be a tendency for 
participants in the OTC derivatives market to conduct their transactions in a 
country with less stringent regulations.176  Because of the global nature of 
the OTC derivatives market, there is limited ability of any single country to 
effectively police the market.  There must be global regulatory cooperation 
to address the problems stemming from the OTC derivatives market.  
Beyond the first step of global regulatory cooperation, we believe a second 
step in regulating this global market is identifying one or more global 
CCPs.  Ideally, the CCPs should be experienced with clearing transactions 
from a number of countries. 
C. Harmonization of the SEC and the CFTC 
The Obama Proposal requires the CFTC and SEC to make 
recommendations to Congress for changes to harmonize regulation of 
futures and securities.177  This recognizes the inherent difficulty in 
regulation that has existed with regulation of futures falling under CFTC 
jurisdiction and regulation of securities falling under SEC jurisdiction.178  It 
does not, however, sufficiently resolve problems that have resulted from 
the current fragmented regulatory scheme,179 such as confusion and delay in 
imposing regulations pending outcomes of turf battles between the SEC 
and the CFTC.180  A more sane approach would be to make that distinction 
unnecessary by merging the CFTC and SEC and creating one regulatory 
 
in the world, the push for a CCP in the Eurozone is of concern in the United Kingdom.  
Additionally, there is concern in the United Kingdom that the United States is pushing to 
establish the regulatory bar for CDS transactions.  See Jones, supra note 13, at 15-16 
(describing regulatory initiatives in the United States and Europe). 
 176. Just as we are concerned about U.S. firms going to other countries to conduct OTC 
derivative transactions, other countries are concerned about their firms going to the United 
States to do the same.  See Jones, supra note 13, at 25-26 (discussing CCPs in relation to the 
U.K. market).  See generally Duffie & Hu, supra note 8 (discussing the role that regulation 
plays in the decision of where a provider of derivatives services locates and where 
derivatives trading occurs). 
 177. White Paper, supra note 11, at 14. 
 178. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 15, at 381 ( “[c]lassifying swap agreements as futures 
or securities is inappropriate, given that they possess features that distinguish them from 
both securities and futures. . . .”).  See generally David B. Esau, Joint Regulation of Single 
Stock Futures:  Cause or Result of Regulatory Arbitrage and Interagency Turf Wars?, 51 
CATH. U. L. REV. 917 (2002) (discussing the “inherent tension” between the SEC and CFTC 
around derivatives regulation); Partnoy, supra note 23, at 430 (discussing the conflicts 
between the SEC and the CFTC and concluding that “such a bifurcated regime is 
problematic”). 
 179. Duffie & Hu, supra note 8, at 24 (“[F]ragmentation of U.S. regulation borders on 
the comical.”).  See supra note 23 (discussing a criticism of the piecemeal, fragmented 
system of regulation). 
 180. See, e.g., Duffie & Hu, supra note 8, at 25 (discussing the delay in introducing new 
products, attributed to turf battles). 
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body with jurisdiction over both. 
Despite our concerns with the proposal as outlined above, we are in 
favor of a regulated derivatives industry.  The current system of self-
regulation has failed.181  We recognize that the complexity of derivative 
 
 181. There are inherent flaws with self-regulation.  See generally Nan S. Ellis, Lisa M. 
Fairchild & Harold D. Fletcher, The NYSE Response to Specialist Misconduct:  An Example 
of the Failure of Self-Regulation, BERKELEY BUS. L. J. (forthcoming) (discussing problems 
with NYSE self-regulation).  See generally Sergio G. Lazzarini & Pedro Carvalho de Mello, 
Governmental Versus Self-Regulation of Derivatives Markets:  Examining the U.S. and 
Brazilian Experience, 53 J. ECON. & BUS. 185 (2001) (comparing governmental regulation 
and self-regulation in terms of competencies and flaws). 
Some commentators have argued for elimination of the self-regulatory model.  See 
generally Ernest E. Badway & Jonathan M. Busch, Ending Securities Industry Self 
Regulation as we Know it, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1351, 1358 (2005) (“[R]ecent events 
indicate that the system of self-regulation may no longer fit the mold of our modern 
securities markets.”); Cally Jordan & Pamela Hughes, Which Way for Market Institutions: 
The Fundamental Question of Self-Regulation, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 205, 208 (2007) 
(“[T]he prevalent self-regulatory model of exchange governance in the United States has 
been susceptible to abuses and scandals for decades.”); Robert Kuttner, The Big Board: 
Crying Out for Regulation, BUS. WK., Oct. 13, 2003, at 26 (quoting former Chairman 
Donaldson:  “In the SOA era, the question has become:  how much longer can we 
reasonably function under the current system of self-regulation?  Is it becoming obvious that 
SROs are not capable of policing anything more than the occasional ‘small-time’ larceny?”). 
Others have recognized the benefits of self-regulation.  See generally Badway & Busch, 
supra, at 1662-63 (discussing the arguments in favor of self-regulation); Onnig H. 
Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation:  Resolving the SRO Identify Crisis, 1 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 317 (2007) (“With all its shortcomings, however, self-regulation 
is inherently a sound – and perhaps somewhat underutilized—means of regulating securities 
market conduct.”); Keaveny, supra note 88, at 1450 (“It seems unlikely that the government 
could operate more efficiently as a sole regulator.”); Kojima, supra note 1, at 275-82 
(discussing market responses to OTC derivative risks); Lynch, supra note 10, at 1405 
(discussing how the industry participants in the credit derivatives market, through their 
“collective effort,” were “able to make remarkable improvements in the infrastructure of the 
credit derivatives market”). 
In fact, commentators offer several perceived benefits of self-regulation.  First, self-
regulation may avoid the slowness of bureaucracies, MICHAEL CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC 
PHENOMENON 3 (1964), and the danger of rigid rules, Steven M.H. Wallman, Competition, 
Innovation, and Regulation in the Securities Markets, 53 BUS. LAW. 341, 356 (1998).  
Second, SROs may understand the securities industry better than governmental regulators.  
Dombalagian, supra, at 318 (“SROs are also best positioned to debate and promulgate 
ethical norms that govern the industry.”); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Control and Governance of 
Transmission Organizations in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 27 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 
569, 602 (2000); Kojima, supra note 1, at 291 (“Unable to compete for the quantitative 
wizards and rocket scientists at the heart of financial innovation, regulators may lack the 
expertise to respond in a dynamic fashion.  Certainly, the government’s track record of 
managing risk in the financial markets should not make OTC derivatives dealers concerned 
that their expertise will be surpassed by that of the public regulators.”); Paul G. Mahoney, 
The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1997) (“[E]xchanges should be the 
primary writers and enforcers of rules relating to disclosure by listed companies, standards 
of conduct for member broker-dealers, and market structure.”).  Professor Mahoney argues 
that a governmental regulator “starts from a substantial disadvantage in information, 
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products makes it challenging to provide regulation that effectively 
manages risk without stifling innovation.182 
V.  CONCLUSION:  A CALL FOR A DIFFERENT TYPE OF REGULATION 
The arguments against regulation of the OTC derivatives market are 
based on a belief that derivatives manage risk.  Some of the arguments 
against regulation are also based on beliefs that OTC derivatives were not 
really the culprit in the GFC, but rather the GFC resulted from a belief in 
the ratings agencies’ assessment of the creditworthiness of OTC derivative 
products and poor judgment on the part of bank risk managers and 
regulators who did not question the analysis of the credit rating agencies.  
Others, however, have recognized that “financial markets not subject to 
restrictive regulation produce national economic crises.”183  It has been 
argued that derivatives don’t manage risk.  Instead, they “create a kind of 
mirage” that merely transfers risk to the counterparty.184 
The current regulatory system has exempted credit derivatives from 
direct regulation and has fragmented indirect oversight between banking 
regulators, the Federal Reserve, the CFTC and the SEC.  Moreover, 
“[s]ince no single regulator or clearinghouse oversees credit derivatives, 
market-wide information is fragmented, making it difficult for market 
participants to have a complete picture of the risks involved.”185  This 
fragmentation stems in part from the fact that there is disagreement over 
which body is the most appropriate regulatory body.186  The Obama 
 
experience, and incentives compared to an exchange.”  Id. at 1462.  Similarly, some have 
asserted that SRO technical expertise allows them to better respond to some regulatory 
problems.  See Keaveny, supra note 88, at 1451 (“The SRO system is preferable to a pure 
government regulatory scheme because it defrays much of the costs onto the market users, 
and makes efficient use of the expertise at the exchanges.”); Jonathan R. Macey, Options for 
Future Regulation of Financial Planners, Part II, 15 J. FIN. PLAN. 90 (2002).  Others argue 
that they may operate more fiscally efficiently.  Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the 
Securities Markets:  A Critical Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 853, 855 (1985).  
Third, self-regulation avoids the governmental costs of SEC oversight.  Dombalagian, 
supra, at 318 (“[T]here are many SROs that provide the critical infrastructure needed to 
ensure fair and efficient markets while sparing the SEC and the public the cost of securities 
oversight.”). 
 182. Kojima, supra note 1, at 323 (“[T]he complexity of many OTC derivatives would 
surely pose an administrative challenge to those charged with enforcing and interpreting the 
securities laws.”); Tijoe, supra note 10, at 388. 
 183. Turgeon, supra note 113, at 141. 
 184. Loomis, supra note 4. 
 185. Tijoe, supra note 10, at 399.  See also Lynch, supra note 10, at 1415-16 (discussing 
how fragmentation also leads to redundancy, increased costs, and reduced efficiency, and 
concluding that the fragmented regulatory scheme is “dysfunctional”). 
 186. See Tijoe, supra note 10, at 415 (arguing that the CFTC is the proper agency to be 
charged with regulation of credit derivatives).  But see Kramer, supra note 26, at 413 
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Proposal fails to adequately address the problems created by this 
fragmentation.  Unfortunately, any regulation will be ineffective without an 
effective enforcer. 
Therefore, we conclude that the power to regulate OTC derivatives 
should be vested in a combined SEC and CFTC.  We are not the first 
scholars to suggest a single regulatory body with authority to regulate 
credit derivatives.187  Also, we are not the first scholars to believe that a 
different regulatory framework is necessary.188  Historically, regulation of 
credit derivatives depended upon whether the specific instrument was best 
categorized as a security (SEC) or as a future or commodity (CFTC).  The 
problem is that today’s complex financial derivatives do not fit neatly into 
one of the above categories.189 
There are many arguments in favor of merging the SEC with the 
CFTC into a single regulatory body.  Most importantly, such an agency 
would be more efficient and a single regulator would provide unified 
 
(concluding that the “SEC, with jurisdiction over the entire scope of derivatives, would be 
more efficient”). 
 187. See, e.g., Brodsky, supra note 89, at 573 (“[T]he division of the equity and equity 
derivatives markets into legal categories of securities and futures, each with different laws 
and different regulators, is an antiquated, inadequate, and burdensome means of overseeing 
these markets as they face challenges from new technological and international 
competitors.”); Esau, supra note 178, at 918 (“[J]oint regulation compounds the problems 
rather than solves them.”); Kramer, supra note 26, at 412 (“Unless the two agencies 
eventually merge they will become rooted in the ‘garden of the forking paths’ of divergent 
policies and ideology despite their outward appearance of working together”); Knepper, 
supra note 88, at 38 (“It clearly would be much simpler if there were only regulator, and 
single agency regulation would be preferable if at all possible.”); Tijoe, supra note 10, at 
415 (“Consequently, one agency with statutory powers to regulate should lead the 
infrastructure development for the credit derivatives market.  This agency should have 
complete jurisdiction to compel all market participants to build an internal infrastructure to 
trade in credit derivatives, establish Chinese walls on their credit derivatives’ trading floors, 
and pay close attention to their contract drafting procedures to avoid ambiguity and 
enforcement conflicts.”).  See id. at 415 (arguing that the CFTC is the proper agency to be 
charged with regulation of credit derivatives). 
 188. See Unterman, supra note 13, at 82 (calling for a stronger regulatory framework and 
a “paradigm shift within the financial industry” forsaking the “mantra of ‘greed is good’”); 
Omarova, supra note 19, at 163 (calling for a “paradigmatic change in the way we approach 
the process of financial innovation” that will allow us to understand, monitor and measure 
the distribution of risk in the global financial system as a whole). 
 189. See Kramer, supra note 26, at 426 (“Justice Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals has correctly analogized the categorization dilemma as trying to decide 
‘whether tetrahedrons belong in square or round holes.’” (quoting Chicago Mercantile Exch. 
v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 1989))).  See also, Karol, supra note 23, at 206 (“The 
U.S. regulatory system continues to be based on the obsolete premise that most financial 
products can be neatly categorized as being either (i) ‘securities’ or (ii) futures or options on 
‘commodities’”); Lynch, supra note 10, at 1416 (questioning whether “this artificial 
compartmentalization of industries create[s] a regulatory framework that is best suited for 
the way that markets actually function”). 
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oversight.190  The regulatory costs of administering derivatives regulation 
would be reduced as redundancies and duplicative oversight is eliminated.  
There would be fewer problems with statutory ambiguities.  A combined 
agency would make sense given the fact that the markets covered by the 
SEC and CFTC are virtually interconnected. 
We advocate that the CFTC become a regulatory arm of the SEC with 
full enforcement powers of its rules.  In addition, it is important that the 
SEC be given adequate resources to be able to regulate the OTC derivatives 
markets in addition to its other existing regulatory responsibilities. 
The Obama Proposal also fails to adequately recognize the global 
nature of the OTC derivatives market.  We advocate that the United States 
coordinate its regulatory efforts for this market with the regulatory agencies 
in other countries that have significant OTC derivative markets.  We are 
concerned that any regulatory action taken by the United States will not be 
effective unless the action is part of a cooperative effort among financial 
regulators in other countries.191 
We also support the Obama Proposal’s requirement that OTC 
derivative transactions be cleared by a regulated CCP.  There is already a 
sense in the OTC derivatives marketplace that something has to be done.  
As a result, several CCPs have emerged as likely prospects for facilitating 
the clearing of transactions.  Participants in the OTC derivatives market 
will likely welcome the increased oversight and price transparency 
provided by CCPs.  We think the requirement that transactions be cleared 
by a regulated CCP will improve the OTC derivatives market, especially if 
regulators from the various countries can cooperate and agree on the type 
 
 190. Just after enactment of the CFMA, scholars predicted that the bifurcated regulatory 
scheme, which placed derivatives market regulation into the hands of both the CFTC and 
the SEC, would result in overlapping, duplicative, and burdensome overregulation.  See, 
e.g., Brodsky, supra note 89, at 583 (“It is important to recognize that . . . the rule review 
process for securities-based stock futures exchanges will be far more burdensome than for 
commodities-based stock futures exchanges”).  Instead, what resulted was an absence of 
regulation. 
 191. Major CCPs are already anticipating regulation and are vying for prominence in the 
event that there is regulatory cooperation on a global basis.  For example, 
IntercontinentalExchange Inc. began clearing credit-derivatives trades in Europe in July, 
2009 as a response to regulators' call to reduce risk in the $26.5 trillion market.  CME Group 
Inc., Eurex and NYSE Euronext also are targeting the European credit-derivatives market 
with their own clearing ventures.  Dealer banks have moved proactively to clear credit-
derivatives trades, staying ahead of U.S. authorities' push to mandate clearinghouses for the 
complex financial instruments.  Jacob Bunge, ICE Starts Clearinghouse for Derivatives in 
Europe, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2009, at C2.  Moreover, Eurex Clearing, Europe’s largest 
clearinghouse, has partnered with Calypso Technology to support the firm’s new central 
clearing service, Eurex Credit Clear, for OTC credit default swaps.  Press Release, Calypso, 
Eurex Clearing Partners with Calypso for OTC Derivatives Central Clearing (July 24, 
2009), http://www.calypso.com/news/pr-2009/072409_Eurex-Clearing-Partners-with-
Calypso-for-OTC-Derivatives-Central-Clearing.php. 
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of regulations that need to be imposed on the CCPs. 
Ultimately, we hope that OTC derivatives are correctly viewed in a 
positive manner because they are useful tools for managing risk.  Aside 
from OTC derivatives, there are many guilty parties with respect to the 
cause of the GFC.  It is encouraging to see that the Obama Proposal 
approaches financial market regulation in a comprehensive manner, rather 
than singling out a few entities that have received the greatest public 
criticism.  With improvements within the regulatory environment, a 
catastrophic financial crisis can hopefully be avoided in the future. 
